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Abstract 
We provide a cross-country evidence on the impact of corporate and personal income taxes, 
and corporate governance systems on debt maturity structures. We find longer debt 
maturities, higher leverage, and, in a dynamic setting, a greater propensity to decrease short-
term debt in countries with high investor protection and classical tax system. Our results 
imply that when investors are protected, firms tend to have optimal debt maturities to 
maximise the gains from tax shields and minimise the tax cost of equity. In contrast, in low 
protection countries, investors prefer their firms to opt for low debt that is mainly short-term 
to mitigate the risk-shifting and debt overhang problems even if this entails forgoing the debt 
tax shields. Our results hold for various robustness checks including the hierarchical linear 
model specification, which corrects for a number of OLS biases.  
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1. Introduction  
Companies are likely to face limited availability of long-term financing sources. Their 
reliance on predominantly short-term debt exposes them to rollover risk, and reduces the 
present value of their tax shields, and their growth potentials (e.g., Diamond, 1991). In the 
presence of agency conflicts between shareholders and debtholders, high leverage results in 
two additional major costs which exacerbates the underinvestment and asset substitution 
problems: (i) risk-shifting driven by shareholders’ incentive to increase the riskiness of the 
firm's existing assets, even when this would reduce the value of their firm (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976; Warga and Welch, 1993), and (ii) debt overhang which arises when debt is 
high and risky, shareholders tend to have a disincentive to commit new equity capital to be 
invested in projects that would make debt safer, even if these projects are value creating 
(Myers, 1977; Diamond and He, 2014). Short-term debt is expected to mitigate these 
conflicts as it reduces the managers’ and the controlling shareholders’ power (Ben-Nasr et al., 
2015), because it is less sensitive to risk shifting in the firm’s underlying assets (Barnea et al., 
1980), and to debt overhang as it matures sooner than the realisation of investment returns 
(Myers, 1977), compared to long-term debt  which amplifies these conflicts when the 
refinancing risk is high due to rollover losses (Almeida et al, 2011; Li, 2013).  
However, Diamond and He (2014) argue that short-term debt can increase or decrease 
debt overhang depending on the timing of the investment. More specifically, debt overhang is 
reduced by short-term debt for assets in place, while it is increased for future investment 
opportunities, because this impact depends on the extent to which the value of short-term 
debt is sensitive to the value of the firm. In particular, when less risk is shared with existing 
short-term debt, the equity value becomes more volatile and debt overhang increases. These 
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arguments suggest that the ability of short-term debt to mitigate these problems depends on 
the severity of the agency conflicts and also the firm’s financial health (Eisdorfer, 2008).  
The tax and agency costs effects on debt maturity structures are not likely to be 
observable in a single country analysis because they are relatively fixed. Unlike previous, 
predominantly US studies, we use various cross-country and firm level tax, governance 
proxies, and rollover risk measures to assess the severity of these problems. We expect 
healthy firms in strong investor protection countries to have a relatively lower rollover risks, 
risk-shifting incentives, and debt overhang problems. Moreover, since short-term debt entails 
opportunity costs of tax shields, we expect firms in strong governance systems to rely more 
on longer debt maturities, when they operate in classical tax system countries to minimise 
their shareholder tax cost, and maximise the interest tax shields. In contrast, debt maturities in 
weak governance countries will be shorter to reflect the investors’ reluctance to trust the 
management even if this entails higher tax costs, and also the possibility that firms evade 
taxes because their credit information-sharing systems and branch penetration are low (Beck 
et al., 2014). We control for other drivers of debt maturity predicted by the signalling 
(Diamond, 1991; Flannery, 1986; Gopalan et al., 2014; Goyal and Wang, 2013), matching 
(Morris, 1976), and macro-economic (Diamond, 1984; Fan et al., 2012) theories to account 
for the funding availability and its access.  
We use a sample of 134,794 firm-year observations based on a sample of 14,207 
firms from 24 OECD countries to test our hypothesis. We split our countries into strong and 
weak investor and creditor protection countries, following Djankov et al. (2008), and into 
classical and imputation tax systems, following Alzahrani and Lasfer (2012) to assess both 
the corporate and personal tax impacts. We use Z-score to measure firms’ financial distress 
risk. Our tests account for the simultaneous choice of debt maturity and leverage, in line with 
Johnson (2003) and Datta et al. (2005), as Barclay et al. (2003) suggest that firms 
 4 
 
endogenously choose leverage and debt maturity. We also test the sensitivity of our results 
using other classifications and definitions of our proxy variables. 
We show that firms located in strong investor countries exhibit significantly longer 
debt maturities. However, within these countries, the maturities are significantly higher in 
classical tax systems and when the tax advantage of debt relative to equity is high. We find 
similar results when we analyse leverage. These results suggest that in strong investor 
countries, firms prefer long-term debt when the debt tax benefits are high, and when 
shareholders are faced with a higher tax cost on equity financing. In contrast, in weak 
investor protection countries, the impact of taxation on the choice of debt maturity is not 
consistent with our expectations. We find that maturities are higher in imputation compared 
to the classical tax system, and the relationship is relatively weak when we account for all 
control variables. We find similar results using the traditional proxy measure for tax effect. 
For example, the term structure of interest rate has a positive and significant effect in strong 
investor protection countries, suggesting that companies use longer maturity of debt when the 
term structure of interest rate is upward sloping, consistent with the tax hypothesis. However, 
we find no evidence of such effects within weak protection countries. Our results hold even 
when we account for all firm and country characteristics and when we exclude the most 
represented US firms which exhibit the longest maturity structures. The impact of the severity 
of distress on debt maturity is also observed when we account for all the control variables, as 
healthy firms appear to have significantly lower short-term debt throughout our analysis. 
Interestingly, in both governance systems, the relationship between taxation and maturity is 
more pronounced in healthy rather than distressed firms, whose main concern is survival.  
We assess the joint effect of governance and taxation on debt maturity by including an 
interaction variable between governance and classical tax system. We find that this variable is 
negative and significant, while the stand-alone investor protection and the tax discrimination 
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variables become insignificant. These results support the arguments that firms do not set 
longer maturities because of governance and tax systems separately, but their decision to opt 
for more long-term debt is driven by the combination of tax optimisation and investor 
protection. The tax discrimination effect is apparent although Graham (2006) argues that it is 
difficult to estimate the shareholders’ personal income and capital gains taxes. We show that 
this impact is significant only when investors are protected.  
We then focus on the agency conflict of debt. In line with Myers’ (1977) arguments 
that firms use shorter maturity debt to minimize the underinvestment problem, we find a 
positive relationship between short-term debt maturity and growth opportunities as measured 
by the market-to-book ratio, which is used as a proxy for risk shifting (Barnea et al, 1980; 
Barclay and Smith, 1995; Guedes and Opler, 1996). However, the abnormal earnings variable 
is positive and significant, consistent with Flannery (1986) and Diamond (1991), but only for 
healthy firms. For distressed companies, its impact is insignificant, probably because they are 
more concerned with their survival than underinvestment and/or signalling. These results 
suggest that short-term debt mitigates the debt overhang problem, as suggested by Myers 
(1977), but only in good times, in line with Diamond and He (2014). We find a homogeneous 
significant effect of firms’ fundamental variables, such as size, leverage, and asset maturity 
across all our specifications, consistent with previous evidence (e.g., Smith and Watts, 1992; 
Barclay and Smith, 1995; Diamond, 1991).  
In a dynamic setting, we find that the probability of firms increasing their short-term 
debt maturity is negatively related to the strong investor protection and creditors’ rights, and 
when the tax cost is high, but this effect is more pronounced in strong investor protection 
countries and when firms are healthy, and have high growth opportunities and low leverage. 
The impact of profitability and risk, as measured by distress and earning volatility, are 
relatively weak, suggesting that firms do not increase their short-term debt because of debt 
 6 
 
overhang problems. Instead, they do so when the gains from tax shields are low and when 
their investors are less protected.  
We also show that firms are less likely to decrease their debt maturities in strong 
investor protection countries, but this likelihood is stronger in classical tax system and when 
the tax discrimination between dividends and capital gains is low, i.e., when there is strong 
tax preference for debt financing. We find that the interaction between investor protection 
and our tax variable, rather than the tax system per se, affects strongly the decision to 
decrease the debt maturity. Moreover, firms are less likely to decrease their maturities when 
they are large, have high leverage, high profitability, and low growth opportunities. These 
results suggest that firms tend to use short-term debt when the potential cost of risk shifting is 
high, in line with Barclay and Smith (1995) and Guedes and Opler (1996). 
Throughout our analysis we control for the firm’s financial constraints, even though 
Farre-Mensa and Ljungqvist (2016) show that no measure is satisfactory. We first expect 
firms that pay dividends to have sufficient internal funds at their disposal to honor their 
contractual obligations, to finance their investments, and to meet their shareholders’ 
expectations, and are, therefore, less likely to be financially constrained (e.g., Fazzari et 
al., 1988). We find a strong negative (positive) effect on short-term debt maturity (leverage), 
but the impact is not robust in weak investor protection countries. We consider, however, that 
the use of payout in our case may be problematic because according to La Porta et al. (2000b) 
weak governance firms may pay low dividends if payouts emanate from a legal protection of 
minority shareholders (outcome model), or high dividends if they are substitute for weak 
shareholder protection (substitute model).
1
 We, therefore, use Whited and Wu (2006) index 
as an alternative measure of financial constraints. Consistent with our expectations, we find a 
homogeneous positive (negative) effect on short-term debt maturity (leverage), suggesting 
                                                          
1
 For further evidence, see, e.g., Alzahrani and Lasfer (2012), Brockman and Unlu (2009), and Faccio et al. 
(2001).  
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that constrained firms have shorter maturities and lower leverage. We find relatively similar 
results using Kaplan and Zingales (1997) index.  
The impact of the remaining variables on the level and changes in short-term debt 
maturities is relatively weak, suggesting that the agency conflicts and tax factors capture most 
of the effects. In particular, we find that the banking sector does not have an impact on the 
level or changes in debt maturity, suggesting that maturity is not affected by the supply of 
debt, and banks are not more likely to be able to supply predominantly debt that is long-term 
or short-term. These results are in contrast with Diamond’s (1984) argument that 
intermediaries take benefit from economies of scale, and Fan et al. (2012) who find that 
banks tend to hold more short-term liabilities, and hence offer mainly short-term loans.  
Our results are related to previous theoretical and empirical studies. Myers (1977) 
argues that the underinvestment problem can be mitigated by using short-term debt because it 
matures before the growth opportunities are exercised. Burkart et al. (2003) argue that 
minority expropriation diminishes as investor protection improves, and the dominant 
shareholders become less prevalent. This reduction abolishes the incentive of risk-taking 
behaviour, and thus shareholders forgo negative net present value investments. These 
arguments suggest that when investors are not protected, short-term debt serves as a 
monitoring device of the agency conflict. Moreover, La Porta et al. (2000a) argue that, in 
strong protection countries, the corporate governance of the broad financial markets is more 
effective, the supply of capital is more efficient, and the credit markets is larger than in weak 
investor protection countries. Our overall results are consistent with these arguments as firms 
located in strong investor protection countries are more likely to use longer debt maturities.  
However, we contribute further to this strand of literature by assessing the combined 
effect of taxes and governance on debt maturities. Unlike previous studies, we focus on the 
differences in tax systems following Graham’s (2006) plea that it would be helpful if there 
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were more studies that exploit the rich variation in tax codes around the world. Scholes and 
Wolfson (1992) argue that under the tax clientele hypothesis, the greater marginal tax rates 
facilitate firms to use the on-going interest tax shields, and thus firms are more likely to 
commit to long-term debt. However, Alzahrani and Lasfer (2012) show that the tax effect is 
more relevant in strong protection countries, where managers are expected to maximise 
firms’ value by maximising the after-tax return of their shareholders. In line with these 
arguments, we find that in strong protection countries and in the classical tax system, where 
dividend is double-taxed at both firm and shareholder levels, firms use longer maturity of 
debt to maximise their debt tax shields and minimise the after-tax returns to their equity 
holders. Our results suggest that when investors are protected, they weigh the tax benefit of 
debt against the potential agency conflicts of extended maturities, but, when they are not, 
they prefer to incur higher tax costs than to trust the management with longer debt maturities.  
Overall, our results suggest that, in strong investor protection countries, managers are 
more inclined to pursue shareholders’ interest by opting for longer maturities to maximise 
after-tax returns, but in weak investor protection countries, managers can get away with 
setting up debt maturities that are independent of tax costs because investors are concerned 
about the mitigation of the debt overhang and risk shifting problems than tax gains. Our 
results provide an additional perspective to the agency explanation of debt maturity decision 
and show that the interrelation between agency costs and taxation explains leverage and debt 
maturity structures across firms and countries. Our findings hold when we exclude US firms, 
we control for time-variation in the relation between leverage, debt maturity, and other firm-
specific factors, we use alternative definitions of governance, measures of distress, and 
econometrics specifications to account for endogeneity, and when we use the hierarchical 
linear model (HLM) method, following Li et al. (2013), to mitigate the OLS method biases. 
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The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides the review of the 
literature and the hypotheses tested. Section 3 presents the data and the methodology. Section 
4 discusses the empirical results and the conclusions are in Section 5.  
2. Theoretical background 
We focus on two main theories that might explain differences in debt maturities 
across firms: agency conflicts and taxes. Under the Jensen and Meckling (1976) agency 
conflict framework, Diamond (1991) argues that shorter-term debt requires frequent 
renegotiations and monitoring from banks, and hence it is a “powerful tool to monitor 
managers” (Stulz, 2000) with a minimum effort (Rajan and Winton, 1995). Empirically, Lin 
et al. (2013) find a positive association between the control-ownership wedge of the 
controlling owner and long-term debt maturity suggesting that self-interested controlling 
owners prefer longer maturity debt to avoid external monitoring by lenders. However, this 
creates conflicts between controlling and minority shareholders over the maturity structure of 
debt. Ben-Nasr et al. (2015) show that firms with multiple large shareholders tend to have 
shorter debt maturities because they limit the ability of controlling owners to extract private 
benefits, as they lead to more frequent external monitoring. 
In addition, firm’s debt maturity is also likely to be affected by the conflict between 
shareholders and debtholders. Myers (1977) suggests that short-term debt mitigates the 
underinvestment problem because it matures before the growth opportunities are exercised. 
Similarly, Barnea et al. (1980) link risk-shifting to debt maturity. They argue that since the 
value of short-term debt is less sensitive to changes in asset volatility, issuing short-term debt 
can reduce risk-shifting incentives. Burkart et al. (2003) argue that as investor protection 
worsens, minority expropriation and the incentive of risk-taking behaviour increase and the 
dominant shareholders become more prevalent. In this case, short-term debt can be used as a 
mechanism to mitigate any potential agency conflicts in weak investor protection countries.  
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However, the use of short-term debt results in a loss of an on-going interest tax 
shields (Scholes and Wolfson, 1992). Empirically, Newberry and Novach (1999) find that 
firms issue bonds with longer maturities when the marginal tax rates are higher. The 
combination of the agency costs and tax shields suggests that firms would trade-off the 
benefit of reducing underinvestment/risk-shifting problems against the opportunity cost of 
interest tax shields when they consider using shorter maturity of debt.  
The empirical evidence provided to date focuses mainly on a single country analysis 
where tax and governance system do not change frequently.
2
 Across countries, some studies 
attempt to investigate how institutional differences affect debt maturity to overcome some of 
these drawbacks. However, the reported evidence is mixed. For example, Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Maksimovic (1999) find that firms in strong creditor rights countries do not use longer debt 
maturities. Fan et al. (2012) and Zheng et al. (2012) find that firms located in common law 
countries use longer maturity of debt. Their results suggest that firms in higher investor 
protection countries prefer longer maturity of debt, in line with La Porta et al. (1998), who 
argue that common law countries provide stronger investor protection than civil law 
countries. These arguments imply that in strong protection countries where agency costs are 
less severe, firms are more likely to use longer maturity of debt, as managers are more likely 
to focus on the corporate and the personal income taxes of their investors, and opt for a 
financing method that will maximise their investors’ after-tax returns. In contrast, in weak 
investor protection countries, their objectives may be other than value creation and the tax 
system may not be fully functional (Beck et al., 2014).  
                                                          
2
 For example, using small and medium sized companies, López-Gracia and Mestre-Barberá (2010) show that 
firms use shorter maturity of debt when they have higher tax rates. Antoniou et al. (2006) find positive and 
significant effects of term structure of interest rates on debt maturity in the UK, in line with the tax predictions, 
but inconsistent with Barclay and Smith (1995), Stohs and Mauer (1996), Guedes and Opler (1996), and Scherr 
and Hulburt (2001). Barclay and Smith (1995) and Guedes and Opler (1996) show that firms with more growth 
options (and therefore higher potential agency costs) have more short-term debt in their capital structure. 
However, the tax and agency costs measures used in single country studies are county invariant. 
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Previous cross-country studies on debt maturity either ignore tax effects (Demirgüç-
Kunt and Maksimovic, 1999) or find mixed evidence (Mateus and Terra, 2013; Zheng et al., 
2012). Fan et al. (2012) argue that debt will be used less in countries with dividend 
imputation than in countries with classical tax systems. They estimate the tax shield using the 
tax gain from leverage introduced in Miller (1977) and find that leverage is higher in 
countries where the tax gain from leverage is positive. However, they do not investigate the 
impact of tax systems on debt maturity. In classical, as opposed to imputation, tax systems, 
firms pay low or no dividend, (Alzahrani and Lasfer, 2012). These arguments suggest that in 
strong protection countries and in the classical tax system, managers are likely to use more 
long-term debt to maximise firm value and to minimise their investors’ after tax returns. 
We also combine the maturity structure with the firm’s choice of debt relative to 
equity financing. Firms may have a higher long-term debt not only because they have less 
short-term debt, but also because they prefer to use long-term debt rather than equity to 
finance their long-term assets. Conversely, their maturity structure may be short-term if their 
preference is more towards equity than debt. We, therefore, expect firms located in countries 
with more favourable dividend tax environments (imputation tax systems) to prefer more 
equity financing and hence use less long-term debt, but more short-term debt.  
3. Data and Methodology  
We first collect all firms registered in OECD countries from DataStream. In line with 
Alzahrani and Lasfer (2012), we exclude Korea, Czech Republic, Chile, Estonia, Greece, 
Hungary, Iceland, Slovak Republic, and Slovenia for lack or unreliable data. We also exclude 
Finland, Japan, Luxemburg, Poland, and Turkey between 1990 and 1999, as we could not 
classify their tax system due to incomplete data, Germany in 1990-2000, Norway in 1990-
1991 and 2006-2011, Mexico 1990-1991, Sweden 1991-1999, and Poland in 2002 because 
they apply other tax treatments. We also exclude financial firms and firms with negative book 
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equity. Our final sample includes 14,207 firms from 24 OECD countries in 1990-2011, 
resulting in 134,794 firm-year observations.
3
 Firm-specific data is from DataStream while 
country-level data is collected from several sources detailed in Appendix 1.  
Our primary empirical tests are based on the following simultaneous equations: 
 𝑆𝑇𝐷𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝐼𝑛𝑣. 𝑝𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐶𝑅𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑇𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐿𝑇𝐵𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 +
∑ 𝛽𝑘 
18
𝑘=1 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡            (1)  
 𝐿𝑇𝐵𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝐼𝑛𝑣. 𝑝𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐶𝑅𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑇𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑆𝑇𝐷𝑅𝑖,𝑡 +
∑ 𝛽𝑘 
16
𝑘=1 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡          (2)  
where STDR is short-term debt divided by total debt, Inv.p is anti-self-dealing index (Djankov 
et al., 2008), CR is creditor right index (Djankov et al., 2007), Classical is a dummy variable 
equal to 1 if the firm is located in a country adopts classical system and zero otherwise, TD is 
Miller’s (1977) tax, and LTBLev is long-term debt over long-term debt plus equity.4 We also 
use the term structure of interest rate to proxy for the tax effects (Brick and Ravid, 1985; 
Garcia-Teruel and Martinez-Solano, 2007) even though Scherr and Hulburt (2001), Barclay 
and Smith (1995), Guedes and Oplimer (1996) and Ozkan (2000) cast doubt on the tax effect.  
Since the estimation of each equation separately will result in biased and inconsistent 
estimated coefficients because of simultaneous equation bias, we use a two-stage estimation 
procedure. We replace the endogenous variables with their predicted values to control for 
endogeneity (Wooldridge, 2002). We follow Dang (2011) to select the instruments for the 
exogenous variables in our model. In the debt maturity equation (1), we use non-debt tax 
shields and tangibility as the instruments for leverage as they are not theoretically related to 
debt maturity (Dang, 2011; Johnson, 2003). In the leverage equation (2), Dang (2011) uses 
only asset maturity and term structure of interest rates as instrumental values for debt 
                                                          
3
 In appendix 5, we report the tax system and TD for each country over the period 2012 to 2016. Our results 
indicate that countries have not switched their tax systems and TD has not changed significantly.  We, therefore, 
expect our overall results to hold in the post 2011 period. 
4
 For the purpose of our hypotheses, we include long-term debt to measure leverage (see section 2).  
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maturity. They select asset maturity and term structure as other variables (e.g., asset maturity, 
tax ratio, term structure of interest rates, volatility, and firm quality) are potentially correlated 
with leverage (e.g., Frank and Goyal, 2009). Similarly, we use asset maturity and term 
structure of interest rates as instruments for debt maturity in Equation (2). 
We use firm-level variables to capture the signalling, tax, agency costs, and matching 
effects. In the presence of information asymmetries, Flannery (1986) shows that high-quality 
firms use short-term debt to signal to the market that they are confident they will honour their 
debt obligations. While both long- and short-term debt are mispriced, only long-term debt is 
more sensitive to asymmetric information. In this case, high quality firms will issue short-
term debt to signal to the market that they can afford to repay the short-term obligations and 
also to cover the transaction costs of debt renegotiation, while low quality firms cannot afford 
to roll over short-term debt, and hence prefer to issue long-term debt. We proxy firms’ 
quality using abnormal earnings as in Stohs and Mauer (1996) and Barclay and Smith (1995). 
The asset maturity hypothesis predicts that firms mitigate their financial risk, which 
arises when their cash flows are not sufficient to cover their commitments, by matching their 
debt and their assets maturities (Morris, 1976). Debt with maturity longer than the maturity of 
assets is risky because the assets may not be enough to cover the debt covenants. To proxy 
for this effect, we use property, plant and machinery over depreciation.   
At country level, Fan et al. (2012) consider the capital suppliers’ preferences on the 
structure of debt maturity.
5
 They argue that firms in countries with developed banking system 
tend to use more short-term debt as banks hold more short-term liabilities. Conversely, firms 
in countries with a larger insurance sector are more likely to use long-term debt. Unlike 
                                                          
5
 Demirg¨uc¸-Kunt and Maksimovic (1999) argue that some country-level data may raise endogeneity problems 
and hence we follow Fan et al. (2012) and use the selected variables that are less likely to cause endogeneity 
issue. However, in contrast to Fan et al. (2012), we do not control for bankruptcy code and deposit insurance, as 
they do not vary across tax system, particularly in our strong protection countries. 
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Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (1999), they find negative impact of the banking sector on 
debt maturity. 
We use banks’ deposits over gross domestic product (GDP) to measure the available 
funds from the banking sector as a proxy for the preferences of the suppliers of the capital. 
We expect that firms in countries with a bigger banking sector to use more short-term debt. 
However, banks’ risk will also affect their lending and maturity choices. We, therefore, use a 
number of bank risk measures. The first is banks’ credit over their deposits. High-credit 
banks have a greater ability to pay their debt when it is due, thereby reducing the risk of 
banks run, implying that firms in countries with low-risk banks to use long-term debt. The 
second is the insurance sector, as proxied by insurance premium (life and non-life) over GDP. 
We expect firms in countries with a bigger insurance sector to use higher long-term debt. 
Finally, to account for liquidity, we use the ratio of gross domestic savings over GDP to 
measure the amount of funds available for all financial intermediaries. We expect firms in 
countries with a greater supplier of capital to use more long-term debt.  
Grossman (1976) argues that prices of listed companies transfer information that can 
be useful for creditors, and hence lending quoted firms to be less risky due to their 
transparency in the stock market. We expect firms in countries with developed stock markets 
to have higher access to long-term credit, thus, more likely to use more long-term debt. 
Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (1999) show that leverage and debt maturity increase with 
the size of stock markets. In addition, higher bond market development provides a better 
protection for borrowers. Hence, we expect firms in countries with better and diversified 
bond markets, measured by bond market capitalisations over GDP, international debt issued 
over GDP, and loan from non-resident banks over GDP, to use more long-term debt.  
Finally, we control for the economic and industry effect condition using inflation and 
yearly industry median of debt maturity, respectively. Inflation makes it costly for firms and 
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investors to contract (Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1999), thus firms will use more short-
term debt when the inflation rate, measured by changes in consumer price index, is high. 
In robustness checks, we check for consistency using alternative statistical 
approaches. We use Generalized Method of Movements (GMM) to control for endogeneity, 
clustered standard errors to count for heteroscedasticity and serial correlation, and the 
hierarchical linear model (HLM) to overcome OLS biases in multilevel structure datasets.    
4. Empirical Results  
4.1. Descriptive Statistics  
Table 1 reports summary statistics of the variables used in our analysis. The mean 
(median) debt maturity, STDR, is 0.43 (0.37), in line with previous evidence (e.g., Fan et al., 
2012; Zheng et al., 2012; Dang, 2011), but higher than the 22% reported by Datta et al. 
(2005). The average book leverage, LTBLev, of 24% is also consistent with previous evidence 
(Antoniou et al., 2008). The remaining variables are also in line with most previous evidence.  
[Insert Table 1 here] 
Table 2 reports the impact of financial health, governance, and taxation on debt 
maturity. We classify our sample into two broad tax systems (classical and imputation),
6
 and 
tax differential ratios, TD, (where high (low) TD indicates above (below) average TD). We 
follow Alzahrani and Lasfer (2012) and Djankov et al. (2008) and classify firms into strong 
investor protection group if their country is above the average anti-self-dealing index. We 
find that about 50% of our observations are in high investor protection countries and the same 
proportion apply the classical tax system (Appendix 2).  
We, then use Z-score to measure financial distress and consider firms with Z values 
below 1.80 to be financially distressed, and market to book ratios to account for growth 
                                                          
6
 We find similar results when we follow Alzahrani and Lasfer (2012) and classify the countries into three tax 
systems, classical where shareholders pay personal taxes on after corporation tax distributed earnings, and 
partial (full) imputation systems where they receive tax credit for the corporate taxes paid on earnings partially 
(fully). 
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opportunities, in line with Diamond and He (2014). We test for differences in means using 
the t-test. We report the average short-term debt maturity, STDR, in Panel A, and long-term 
book value of leverage, LTBLev, in Panel B. The results based on total debt over total assets, 
and long-term debt over long-term debt plus the market value of equity are relatively similar.  
The results show that the distribution of maturity structures and leverage across 
governance, financial health, and tax systems is not homogenous. Debt has longer maturity in 
strong protection countries across different tax systems, and independently of the firm’s 
financial strength. The economic impact is relatively more pronounced for healthy firms, 
particularly in our classification by creditor protection. The distribution by tax discrimination 
variable also indicates that firms that operate in the low tax system, where the after tax return 
on equity income is high, appear to opt for more short-term, rather than long-term debt. They 
tend to have also lower leverage (Panel B), suggesting that these firms prefer equity rather 
than debt financing. Moreover, high growth firms, as measured by the market-to-book ratio, 
have higher short-term debt, although the economic difference is not too high. Finally, when 
we sort our companies by leverage, we find that low long-term debt firms have significantly 
higher short-term debt. The results are relatively similar when we use creditor protection. 
Panel B reports the distribution of leverage by governance, tax, and firms’ financial 
health. The results, not reported, indicate that firms in high governance countries have 
relatively similar level of debt than firms in low governance systems. In both systems, the 
distribution of long-term debt is relatively monotonically distributed across the tax systems 
and firms’ characteristics: Leverage is high for firms that operate in a classical tax system, in 
countries with high TD, and when their market-to-book is low, i.e., when they are mature. In 
line with Fan et al. (2012) our results indicate that debt is used less in countries with dividend 
imputation than in countries with classical tax systems, but we show also that the Miller 
(1977) tax differential ratio affects significantly leverage. The last two rows indicate that 
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short-term and long-term debts are substitutes as firms with low short-term debt maturity 
have significantly higher long-term debt. Throughout our classifications, the distress factor is 
predominant: distressed firms appear to have significantly higher leverage than healthy firms.  
 [Insert Table 2 here] 
4.2. Regression Results  
In this section we report the results of our regression tests. We use time fixed effects 
to account for unobserved heterogeneity across time that may be correlated with the 
explanatory variables, followed byProbit regressions to investigate the impact of taxation and 
governance on the decision to change debt maturity. For robustness checks, we cluster the 
standard errors at the firm level to account for heteroscedasticity and serial correlation of 
errors Generalized Method of Movements (GMM) to control for endogeneity, and the 
hierarchical linear model (HLM) to correct OLS biases. 
4.2.1. Determinants of Debt Maturity Structure  
Table 3, Panel A, reports the regression results of the determinants of debt maturity. 
The first column indicates that firms in our sample are more likely to have longer debt 
maturities when they operate in strong investor protection countries, classical tax system, and 
when they have high leverage. The tax discrimination variable is negative implying that firms 
prefer short-term debt when their investors’ equity income is taxed at a relatively lower rate. 
The control variables are as expected. Firms with high short-term debt are more likely to be 
high growth, financially constrained, small, with low profitability, short asset maturity and 
relatively distressed. Similarly, at macro level, firms in countries with high bank deposits, 
low bank credit, and low stock liquidity are more likely to rely on short-term debt financing.  
In the remaining columns, we assess whether our results are not driven by US firms 
which are relatively highly represented in our sample. We provide results for both the US 
distressed and healthy firms to account for the severity of the debt agency conflicts. For 
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healthy firms, the results are qualitatively similar, except for the significance of abnormal 
earnings and the weak impact of profitability, stock market liquidity, bank deposit, and bank 
credit. In contrast, for distressed firms, growth opportunities and abnormal earnings do not 
affect debt maturity structures, and bank deposit is negatively related to maturity.  
We split countries in the rest of the world (ROW) into strong and weak investor 
protection. While long-term debt ratio, asset maturity (AM), and firm size remain statistically 
and economically significant, the impact of the remaining variables is relatively weak. In 
particular, creditors’ rights (CR), taxation, profitability (ROA), and firm’s growth 
opportunities (MB) affect maturity of mainly healthy firms in strong investor protection 
countries. The proxy for firm’s quality, abnormal earnings, is not always positive and 
significant, implying that high-quality firms do not use short-term debt to signal to the market 
their future prospects, in line with Ozkan (2000), but in contrast to Stohs and Mauer (1996). 
Burkart et al. (2003) argue that in strong investor protection managers have a greater 
discretion to reduce risk-taking, and, hence, borrowers in less risky businesses have lower 
incentives to lower agency costs by shortening maturity (Guedes and Opler, 1996). La Porta 
et al. (2000a) argue that the corporate governance that accompanies broad financial markets 
is more effective, the supply of capital is more efficient, and the credit market is larger than 
in weak investor protection countries. Boubakri and Gouma (2010) also show that higher 
investors’ protection reduces bond spreads and increases corporate bond ratings. All these 
arguments suggest that firms have a better access to long-term debt in strong investor 
protection countries. Consistently, in our analyses the coefficients of investor protection 
(Inv.p) and creditors’ rights (CR) are mainly negative and significant, suggesting that firms 
have longer maturities where investor protection is better.  
The tax discrimination (TD) is not significant in weak investor protection countries 
and when firms are distressed, suggesting that the tax effects are more relevant in strong 
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protection countries, where managers are expected to maximise their shareholders’ value by 
paying more corporate tax to increase their shareholders’ after-tax returns. For financially 
distressed companies, the tax is irrelevant because they are making losses, thus the interest 
tax shield is not relevant. In Panel C, we report results with interaction effects. The control 
variables remained relatively the same, thus we do not report them. The results indicate that 
the classical dummy is still negative and significant suggesting that in countries that adopt the 
classical tax system, firms prefer to have more long-term debt to benefit from the tax shields. 
The interaction variable with investor protection is more negative and significant.  
Similarly, the interaction of TD and investor protection is negative and significant 
while TD on its own is not significant. These results suggest that the tax impact is more 
observed in strong investor protection countries. This is, however, not the case when we use 
creditors’ rights, suggesting that investor protection is more likely to capture the level of 
agency conflicts. The interaction between TD and CR is positive but insignificant, in contrast 
to our expectations. Overall, our results imply that in weak investor protection countries, 
managers may not consider the tax benefits as their objective is not to maximise shareholder 
value, or their tax system is inefficient as reported by Beck et al. (2014). The impact of the 
term structure of interest rate, TS, a proxy for the tax effect (Brick and Ravid, 1985) is weak, 
in line with Barclay and Smith (1995) and Stohs and Mauer (1996).  
Similar results are observed for the macro-economic variables. We find that firms 
located in countries with a bigger banking system, as measured by bank deposits, use more 
short-term debt as they hold more short-term liabilities, in line with Fan et al. (2012). 
However, this does not apply when we split our sample into different categories. Inconsistent 
with the preference of capital suppliers, we find that, firms in countries with a bigger 
insurance sector do not necessarily use short-term debt, in line with Fan et al. (2012). We also 
measure the amount of funds available for all financial intermediaries by gross domestic 
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saving over GDP and do not find that firms with greater level of domestic savings have more 
long-term debt. In contrast to Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (1999), active stock markets, 
measured by stock traded over GDP, do not necessarily promote the use of long-term debt, 
and the inflation rate is weakly associated with long-term debt, unlike Fan et al. (2012).  
In Table 3, Panel B, the dependent variable is the book value of leverage. The first 
column indicates that firms in strong investor protection countries, creditors’ rights, classical 
tax system and where TD is high have relatively higher leverage. These firms are more likely 
to have longer debt maturities, low growth (MB), low profitability (ROA), but high tangibility 
of assets (Tg). They are also large and less likely to be financially distressed. The negative 
relationship between leverage and short-term debt maturity across countries is consistent with 
Morris (1992), who argues that firms with higher leverage use long-term debt to postpone 
their probability of bankruptcy. But the results are inconsistent with Dennis et al. (2000), who 
show that leverage is inversely related to debt maturity.  
Firms with higher growth opportunities, as measured by the market-to-book ratio, use 
shorter debt maturities to mitigate the underinvestment problem, in line with Myers (1977), 
Barclay and Smith (1995) and Guedes and Opler (1996), but in contrast with Stohs and 
Mauer (1996). Firms with high leverage are likely to be in countries where bank deposit is 
low, bank credit, bond capital, stock liquidity, and domestic savings are high, but inflation 
and bank deposits are low. The remaining results are relatively similar to the findings in 
Panel A and indicate that these fundamental effects on leverage are mainly observed in strong 
investor countries and when firms are not distressed. 
Panel C also reports the interaction effects for leverage. The impact of the control 
variables is qualitatively similar, thus not reported. The results indicate that Classical and TD 
are still significant. However, while the interactions of investor protection, creditors’ rights 
and TD are not significant, the interactions with classical dummy are positive and significant, 
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suggesting that in countries where shareholders and creditors are protected, and where the tax 
benefits are high, firms have a higher level of debt. 
[Insert Table 3 here]  
 
4.2.2 Changes in Debt Maturity  
Table 4 reports the results of the impact of taxation and governance on the decision to 
change debt maturity. We estimate the following Probit regression: 
Pr(𝑑𝑖,𝑡 = 1) =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝐼𝑛𝑣. 𝑝𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐶𝑅𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑇𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐿𝑇𝐵𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 +
∑ 𝛽𝑘 
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𝑘=1 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                                        (3) 
where Pr(di,t=1) is an indicator of firms in our sample that increase their short-term debt 
maturity. Xi is a vector of firm and country explanatory variables; their coefficients are 
estimated using maximum likelihood estimation. The dependent variable in Panel A is a 
dummy equals to 1 if the firm increases short-term debt maturity and zero otherwise. Panel B 
shows the likelihood of increasing short-term debt versus those firms who decrease and 
maintain their debt maturity. In Panel A, the results of the full sample show that firms located 
in strong investor and creditors’ protection are more likely to use more long-term debt 
through time. The marginal effect (ME) indicates that, on average, firms increase their long-
term debt by about 0.04 for a unit increase in governance index. The impact of the creditor 
protection variable is relatively smaller. The impact of the tax variables is more pronounced. 
The results indicate that firms in the classical tax system and when TD is high tend to reduce 
their short-term debt, and thus, increase their long-term debt. When we split our sample into 
different groups, the tax impact is still significant, particularly in strong investor protection 
countries and when the firm is healthy. In line with our previous results, in weak investor 
protection countries and when firms are distressed, the tax impact is weak. 
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High levered firms are also more likely to decrease their short-term maturity and to 
opt for long-term debt, in line with Morris (1992). The marginal effect ranges between 0.192 
and 0.362. The impact of growth is also significant, except when firms are financially 
distressed in strong investor protection countries. The impact of the remaining variables is 
relatively weak. In particular, the results show that larger companies with greater asset 
maturities and lower growth opportunities are not necessarily more likely to increase their 
long-term debt, in contrast to our predictions. These results are not in line with Barclay and 
Smith (1995) and Stohs and Mauer (1996) who show that long-term debt increases with size 
and asset maturity, and decreases with growth opportunities, but relatively consistent with 
Guedes and Opler (1996) who find that size has a U-shaped impact on debt maturity, 
suggesting that firms issue in the middle of the maturity spectrum, while larger firms issue at 
both extremes of debt maturity. 
Panel B reports the impact of the interaction variables. The results indicate that firms 
in strong investor protection countries with classical tax systems are more likely to increase 
the maturity structure of their debt. Similar results are observed for the interaction of TD and 
investor protection and when the dependent variable is defined as maintaining debt maturity. 
The impact of these variables on their own is relatively weak, suggesting that a combination 
of the governance and tax systems that is more likely to affect debt maturity.   
[Insert Table 4 here] 
4.2.3 Robustness Check  
In this section, we conduct several robustness checks of our empirical findings to 
assess further the impact of the interaction between taxation and investor protection on short-
term debt maturity and leverage. The results are reported in Table 5. The control variables 
remained relatively the same, thus we do not report them. In Equation (1), we test for 
alternative measures of the investor protection variable by replacing the anti-self-dealing 
 23 
 
index with the revised anti-directors' rights of Spamann (2010). The results in Panel A are 
qualitatively similar. The tax and governance variables are significant, and the interaction 
between these variables is also significant, except for creditors’ rights x classical. These 
results provide further evidence that firms that operate in strong investor protection and high 
tax system prefer to have longer debt maturities. The results in Panel B provide further 
support to these findings. Firms in countries with strong investor protection, classical tax 
systems, and where the investor after tax return on debt income is higher than equity income 
have higher leverage. The interaction variables are also mainly significant, suggesting that 
both investor protection and tax systems affect firms’ leverage. The results are qualitatively 
similar for healthy firms, reported in Panels C to D. For distressed firms the impact is 
consistent but relatively weak. 
In Equation (2), we find similar results when we follow Zheng et al. (2012) and report 
cross-country regressions. The interaction of TD and investor protection is negative and 
significant while TD on its own is not significant. In line with our overall results, the impact 
of governance and taxation is more pronounced for healthy rather than distressed firms. In 
Equation (3), we measure distress, following Mehran and Prestiani (2010) and Bharath and 
Dittmar (2010), as the following bankruptcy time length, after controlling for related factors:  
h(t, X (t)) = h(t, 0) 𝑒𝑥𝑝(B X(t))                                                                                               (4) 
where h (t, X(t)) is the hazard rate at time t for a firm with covariates X(t). This model 
controls for the effects of differences between firms as well as changes over time. We also 
assume that there is a probability of bankruptcy every year to satisfy the assumption of 
proportional hazard in which explanatory variables are time-invariant. Firms are classified as 
healthy (distressed) if the hazard rate is below (above) the sample mean. The Hazard ratio is, 
like Z-score, highly significant and the remaining results are qualitatively similar. The 
coefficients of the interaction variables of TD, classical, and investor protection are more 
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sizable for the sample as a whole, and the results are more robust for healthy firms. In 
Equation (4) our results are similar when we include country-level institutional ownership to 
total market capitalisation, Ins. Ownership.  
We test for robustness of our estimation techniques in Equations (5) to (7). In 
Equation (5), following Dang (2011), we use a dynamic panel estimation, the Generalized 
Method of Movements (GMM). In Equations (5)-(6), we use the following instruments to 
control for endogeneity. In Panels A, C, and E, we include the first lagged short-term debt 
maturity, L.STDR. We use the second lagged debt short-term debt maturity as an instrument 
for the first lagged short-term debt maturity. In Panels B, D, and F, we include the first 
lagged long-term book leverage, L.LTBLev. The second lagged long-term book leverage is 
used as an instrument for the first lagged long-term leverage. In Equation (5) in all panels, we 
use lagged control variables as instruments to yield a better fit, following Dang (2011). We 
report AR(1), AR(2) and Sargan p-values to test the null hypothesis of no first-order and 
second-order serial correlation, and over-identifying restrictions under the null hypothesis of 
valid instruments, respectively. The lagged short-term debt maturity (Panel A) and leverage 
(Panel B), not reported, are positive and significant, supporting the dynamic adjustment 
model. We find same results when we cluster the standard errors at the firm level in Equation 
(6) to account for heteroscedasticity and serial correlation of errors (Peterson, 2009).  
Since our data structure is multilevel, in Equation (7) we estimate the following 
hierarchical linear models (HLM) specification (Li et al., 2013), where the set of firms within 
countries form the base-level observations, while countries are the higher-level observations: 
as follows: 
 𝑦𝑖,𝑗 = 𝛽0 + ∑ 𝛽𝑘
4
𝑘=1 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠_𝑐𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑗 + ∑ 𝛽𝑘
𝐾
𝑘=1 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚_𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿_𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑑𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑗 +
∑ 𝛽𝑘 
𝐾
𝑘=1 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚_𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿_𝑐𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛𝑗 + ∑ 𝛽𝑘 
𝐾
𝑘=1 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦_𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿_𝑐𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑗 +
𝜀𝑖,𝑗                                                                                                                                                                                                                    (5) 
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where y is short-term debt maturity (leverage), STDR (LTBLev), in Panels A, C, and E (B, D, 
and F). Following Li et al. (2013), for firm level variables, we consider firm-level deviations 
(-dev) and country-level means (-ctrymean). For country-level variables, we consider grand-
mean centred country-level deviations (-ctry).
7
 This specification allows us to separates the 
variance in firm-level debt maturity and leverage into what is determined by the firm versus 
country-level explanatory variables. HLM also corrects for the distortion introduced by 
varying sample sizes across countries and avoid the OLS bias as the coefficient on a country-
level variable can be spuriously significant simply because of the large sample size at the 
firm level. This problem is accentuated when countries differ markedly in the number of 
firms in the sample. The HLM framework, unlike the OLS regression where each firm-level 
observation receives equal weight, simultaneously models regressions at both the firm-level 
and the country-level. The country-level regression weighted by the precision of the firm-
level data, which is inversely related to the sample size within a country. Moreover, the HLM 
specification accurately incorporates cross-level interactions between the firm- and country-
level variables.  
Our results are qualitatively similar. However, in Panel A, only the interaction 
coefficients are significant, suggesting that governance systems and taxes alone do not 
explain a large proportion of the levels of debt maturity although the combinations of those 
factors affect debt maturity significantly. The results for healthy firms are relatively similar, 
except the stand alone coefficients of tax (TD and Classical) which are also significant. In 
contrast, these results for distressed firms are relatively weak showing that when firms are 
healthy the tax benefit of debt is more evident than the potential agency conflicts of extended 
maturities. 
                                                          
7
 For STDR (LTBLev) HLM regression, K is the number of control variables which is 11 (9), 11 (9), and 12 
(12) for firm-level deviations, -firmdev, firm-level country means,-ctrymean, and grand-mean centred country-
level deviations, -ctry, respectively. The control variables in Equations 1 and 2 (Section 3) are defined in 
Appendix 1. 
 26 
 
Taxes, governance variables are significant, and the between these variables is also 
significant, except for creditors’ rights x classical. These results provide further evidence that 
firms that operate in strong investor protection and high tax system prefer to have longer debt 
maturities. The results in Panel B provide further support to these findings. Firms in countries 
with strong investor protection, classical tax systems, and where the investor after tax return 
on debt income is higher than equity income have higher leverage. The significant interaction 
variables suggest that governance and tax systems affect firms’ leverage. The results are 
qualitatively similar for healthy firms, reported in Panels C to D. For distressed firms the 
impact is consistent but relatively weak. 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
5. Conclusions 
Using a large cross-country data, we find that debt maturity is affected by both firm 
and country factors. We show that a combination of governance and taxes explain a large 
proportion of the levels and changes in debt maturity and leverage. Firms in weak investor 
protection countries have significantly shorter maturities, and the impact of taxation on the 
choice of debt maturity is not consistent with our expectations. In contrast, those in strong 
investor protection countries have longer maturities and debt levels, particularly in classical 
tax systems, and when the tax advantage of debt relative to equity is high to maximise the 
debt tax shields and their investors’ after-tax returns. To capture the agency conflicts relating 
to debt overhang and risk shifting, we assess whether this relationship is dependent on the 
firm’s financial health. We find that healthy firms have significantly lower short-term debt 
and higher leverage and the relationship between taxation and maturity is more pronounced 
in healthy rather than distressed firms that are likely to be more concerned with survival 
rather than tax saving. Various robustness checks confirm these findings and show that 
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macro-economic factors, such as financial markets development exert relatively weak effects 
on debt maturities. 
We expand previous studies by providing a relatively deeper analysis of the combined 
impact of investor protection and taxation on leverage and debt maturity structures. However, 
our results may suffer from limitations inherent in cross-country studies as the accounting 
numbers may not be comparable, firms may be subject to tax and governance structures in 
other than their country of registration, they may face different effective corporate and 
personal tax rates, and they can have other internal and external corporate governance 
mechanisms to mitigate their agency conflicts, including specific ownership structure, insider 
ownership, and board structure, in addition to the magnitude of the country level investor 
protection.  
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Table 1: Summary statistics of firm- and country-level variables 
Variables  N Mean SD Median Min Max 
STDR 134,794 0.43 0.34 0.37 0.00 1.00 
Inv.p 134,794 0.58 0.19 0.64 0.17 0.95 
CR 134,794 2.03 1.07 2.00 0.00 4.00 
Classical Tax 134,794 0.50 0.50 1.00 0.00 1.00 
TD 134,794 0.08 0.17 0.03 -0.13 0.46 
LTBLev 134,763 0.24 0.21 0.19 0.00 0.69 
MB 120,777 2.28 2.11 1.56 0.41 9.04 
Size 125,839 12.00 2.07 11.86 8.36 15.77 
AB 117,762 0.00 0.04 0.00 -0.07 0.08 
ROA 131,403 0.02 0.16 0.06 -0.54 0.22 
AM 134,422 0.31 0.23 0.27 0.01 0.80 
TS 132,868 0.56 1.10 0.76 -1.63 2.37 
Z-score  133,593 2.96 2.45 2.47 -0.99 9.58 
WW Index 109,829 0.52 0.08 0.52 0.26 0.77 
Div-dummy 129,325 0.58 0.49 1.00 0.00 1.00 
Bank Dep. 134,794 0.95 0.65 0.73 0.00 3.95 
Bank Credit 134,794 0.90 0.59 0.83 0.00 15.74 
Ins. Prem. 134,794 0.07 0.03 0.07 0.00 0.18 
Bond Cap. 129,939 1.12 0.61 0.88   0.02 2.56 
Inter. Debt  134,794 0.28 0.27 0.20 0.00 2.66 
Stock Traded 134,794 1.00 0.70 0.83 0.15 2.84 
Inflation 134,794 0.02 0.02 0.02 -0.01 0.04 
Domestic Savings 134,794 0.23 0.08 0.23 0.00 0.39 
Ind. Med 134,794 0.63 0.21 0.64 0.00 1.00 
The sample includes 134,794 firm/year observations from 24 OECD countries. The variables are defined in Appendix 1. N is for number of observations, SD is standard 
deviation. The data is winsorized at the top and bottom 1%. 
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Table 2: Tests for Mean Differences  
 Strong Investor Protection  Weak Investor Protection Strong Creditor Protection Weak Creditor Protection 
 Healthy H Distressed D (H-D) Healthy H Distressed D (H-D) Healthy H Distressed D (H-D) Healthy H Distressed D (H-D) 
Panel A: STDR (short-term debt/ total debt)  
Classical (1) 0.29 0.34 -0.05
***
 0.44 0.42 0.02 0.28 0.32 -0.04
***
 0.42 0.39 0.03
***
 
Imputation (2) 0.40 0.39 0.01 0.52 0.48 0.04
***
 0.44 0.41 0.03
**
 0.48 0.44 0.04
***
 
(1) – (2) 0.11*** 0.05***  0.08*** 0.06***  0.16*** 0.09***  0.06*** 0.05***  
High TD 0.27 0.36 -0.09
***
 0.52 0.48 0.04
***
 0.31 0.35 -0.04
***
 0.52 0.47 0.05
***
 
Low TD 0.39 0.38 0.01 0.53 0.50 0.03
***
 0.46 0.42 0.04
***
 0.43 0.44 -0.01 
High-Low -0.12
***
 -0.02
***
  -0.01
**
 -0.02
***
  -0.15
***
 -0.07
***
  0.09
***
 0.03
***
  
High MB 0.34 0.38 -0.04
***
 0.55 0.47 0.08
***
 0.34 0.39 -0.05
***
 0.46 0.45 0.01 
Low MB 0.35 0.34 0.01 0.50 0.43 0.07
***
 0.37 0.35 0.02
*
 0.49 0.46 0.03
**
 
High-Low -0.01 0.04
***
  0.05
***
 0.04
***
  -0.03
***
 0.04
***
  -0.03
***
 -0.01  
High LTBLev 0.15 0.16 -0.01 0.35 0.40 -0.05
***
 0.17 0.18 -0.01 0.29 0.35 -0.06
***
 
Low LTBLev 0.50 0.68 -0.18
***
 0.63 0.70 -0.07
***
 0.49 0.68 -0.19
***
 0.60 0.70 -0.10
***
 
High-Low -0.35
***
 -0.52
***
  -0.28
***
 -0.30
***
  -0.32
***
 -0.50
***
  -0.31
***
 -0.35
***
  
Panel B: LTBLev (long-term debt/ long-term debt +book value of equity)  
Classical (1) 0.24 0.36 -0.12
***
 0.21 0.37 -0.16
***
 0.24 0.34 -0.10
***
 0.20 0.36 -0.16
***
 
Imputation (2) 0.17 0.33 -0.16
***
 0.17 0.35 -0.18
***
 0.19 0.33 -0.14
***
 0.17 0.34 -0.17
***
 
(1) – (2) 0.07*** 0.03***  0.04*** 0.02***  0.05*** 0.01***  0.03*** 0.02***  
High TD 0.22 0.33 -0.11
***
 0.17 0.35 -0.18
***
 0.25 0.36 -0.11
***
 0.16 0.35 -0.19
***
 
Low TD 0.18 0.30 -0.12
***
 0.17 0.37 -0.20
***
 0.18 0.30 -0.12
***
 0.18 0.37 -0.19
***
 
High-Low 0.04
***
 0.03
***
  0.00 -0.02
**
  0.07
***
 0.06
***
  -0.02
***
 -0.02
**
  
High MB 0.19 0.32 -0.13
***
 0.14 0.32 -0.18
***
 0.24 0.35 -0.11
***
 0.15 0.31 -0.16
***
 
Low MB 0.22 0.33 -0.11
***
 0.19 0.40 -0.21
***
 0.20 0.32 -0.12
***
 0.18 0.37 -0.19
***
 
High-Low -0.03
***
 -0.01
*
  -0.05
***
 -0.08
***
  0.04
***
 0.03
**
  -0.03
*
 -0.06
***
  
High STDR 0.11 0.17 -0.06
***
 0.10 0.24 -0.14
***
 0.13 0.20 -0.07
***
 0.09 0.21 -0.12
***
 
Low STDR 0.30 0.47 -0.17
***
 0.24 0.45 -0.21
***
 0.31 0.47 -0.16
***
 0.25 0.46 -0.21
***
 
High-Low -0.19
***
 -0.30
***
  -0.14
***
 -0.21
***
  -0.18
***
 -0.27
***
  -0.16
***
 -0.25
***
  
This table reports the tests for mean differences of short-term debt maturity, STDR, measured as short-term debt over total debt (Panel A), and long-term book value of leverage, LTBLev (Panel 
B). Strong (weak) investor protection is when anti-self-dealing index score reported by Djankov et al. (2008) is above (below) the mean overall scores. Strong (weak) creditor protection is when 
creditor rights index score reported by Djankov et al. (2007) is above (below) the mean overall scores. High (low) TD is when Miller Tax ratio is larger (smaller) than the overall mean. Firms 
with Z-score below 1.80 are financially distressed. We use the median per country as the benchmark in our market-to-book ratios, MB, long-term book value of leverage, LTBLev, and short-term 
debt maturity, STRD, groups. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.   
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Table 3: Determinants of Debt Maturity Structure and Leverage 
 All US ROW - Strong inv.p ROW - Weak inv.p 
 Healthy Distressed Healthy Distressed Healthy Distressed 
Panel A. Dependant variable is STDR: short-term debt/ total debt 
Inv.p 
 
CR 
 
Classical 
 
TD 
 
LTBLev 
 
MB 
 
Size 
 
AB 
 
ROA 
 
AM 
 
TS 
 
WW Index 
 
Div-dummy 
 
Z-score 
 
Bank Dep. 
 
Bank Credit 
 
Ins. Prem. 
 
Bond Cap. 
 
Inter. Debt 
 
Stock Traded 
 
Inflation 
 
Domestic Savings 
 
Ind. Med 
 
Constant 
 
-0.086*** 
(-8.99) 
-0.004** 
(-2.63) 
-0.024*** 
(-6.45) 
-0.001** 
(-2.20) 
-0.022*** 
(-15.56) 
0.006*** 
(8.14) 
-0.027*** 
(-15.76) 
0.103 
(0.27) 
-0.367*** 
(-4.12) 
-0.061*** 
(-11.03) 
0.002* 
(-1.79) 
0.118** 
(3.05) 
-0.104*** 
(-27.69) 
-0.015*** 
(-7.32) 
0.000*** 
(8.70) 
-0.000*** 
(-5.19) 
0.002 
(1.01) 
-0.000 
(-1.38) 
-0.000 
(-1.03) 
-0.000*** 
(-4.28) 
-0.001 
(-0.44) 
-0.017 
(-0.74) 
-0.519*** 
(-10.05) 
1.489*** 
(5.27) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.285** 
(-3.00) 
-0.486** 
(-2.62) 
0.018*** 
(6.86) 
-0.014** 
(-1.99) 
0.571*** 
(3.80) 
-0.363* 
(-1.70) 
-0.162*** 
(-5.60) 
-0.007 
(-0.97) 
0.686*** 
(4.40) 
-0.165*** 
(-10.73) 
 
 
0.005 
(1.65) 
-0.006 
(-1.66) 
0.003 
(0.75) 
-0.002 
(-0.01) 
-0.003 
(-1.42) 
0.000 
(1.13) 
-0.005 
(-0.94) 
-0.086 
(-1.03) 
-0.213*** 
(-5.52) 
1.222*** 
(5.54) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.201 
(-0.66) 
-0.825*** 
(-2.61) 
0.011*** 
(4.28) 
-0.024*** 
(-3.49) 
0.015 
(0.06) 
-0.198*** 
(-5.59) 
-0.052* 
(-1.90) 
-0.016 
(-1.32) 
0.859*** 
(5.20) 
-0.143*** 
(-6.91) 
 
 
-0.013*** 
(-2.60) 
-0.001 
(-0.32) 
0.003 
(0.38) 
0.003 
(1.60) 
-0.001 
(-0.02) 
0.000 
(1.66) 
-0.007 
(-1.05) 
-0.080 
(-0.64) 
-0.252*** 
(-4.85) 
1.786*** 
(3.57) 
 
 
-0.002*** 
(-3.18) 
-0.014** 
(-2.10) 
-0.091* 
(-1.74) 
-0.021*** 
(-7.96) 
0.001 
(0.89) 
-0.027*** 
(-7.08) 
0.057* 
(1.80) 
-0.363*** 
(-3.79) 
-0.079*** 
(-7.09) 
-0.009* 
(-1.88) 
0.195** 
(2.27) 
-0.116*** 
(-14.00) 
 
 
0.000 
(1.57) 
-0.000 
(-0.26) 
0.001 
(0.78) 
-0.001 
(-0.48) 
0.000 
(1.20) 
0.001** 
(1.81) 
-0.002 
-(0.59) 
-0.020 
(-0.41) 
-0.433*** 
(-8.49) 
1.543*** 
(4.23) 
 
 
0.105 
(0.90) 
-0.032 
(-1.45) 
-0.002** 
(-1.93) 
-0.618*** 
(-5.98) 
0.008*** 
(4.34) 
-0.024*** 
(-5.10) 
-0.072 
(-0.75) 
0.219*** 
(8.19) 
-0.063*** 
(-4.76) 
-0.014 
(-1.19) 
0.257** 
(2.39) 
-0.150*** 
(-13.61) 
 
 
0.001** 
(2.88) 
-0.001** 
(-2.21) 
0.001 
(0.24) 
0.000 
(0.57) 
-0.002 
(-0.04) 
0.000 
(0.55) 
-0.009 
(-1.40) 
-0.119 
(-1.54) 
-0.310*** 
(-12.94) 
1.801*** 
(8.97) 
 
 
-0.006 
(-1.35) 
-0.015** 
(-2.62) 
-0.031*** 
(-4.61) 
-0.647*** 
(-5.68) 
0.003** 
(2.23) 
-0.018*** 
(-5.18) 
0.068** 
(2.34) 
0.306*** 
(10.11) 
-0.067*** 
(-5.74) 
-0.013*** 
(-4.02) 
0.042*** 
(3.54) 
-0.095 
(-1.97) 
 
 
0.000*** 
(3.33) 
-0.001** 
(-2.00) 
0.000 
(0.21) 
0.000 
(0.87) 
-0.001*** 
(-2.92) 
-0.000* 
(-1.91) 
0.010*** 
(3.79) 
-0.002 
-(0.05) 
-0.629*** 
(-6.88) 
1.242*** 
(3.73) 
 
 
0.001 
(0.45) 
0.003 
(0.54) 
-0.026 
(-1.60) 
-0.388*** 
(-3.50) 
0.009*** 
(6.27) 
-0.038*** 
(-13.04) 
-0.002 
(-0.07) 
0.011 
(0.42) 
-0.071*** 
(-6.99) 
-0.003 
(-0.91) 
0.247 
(1.47) 
-0.065 
(-1.36) 
 
 
0.000 
(1.15) 
-0.002 
(-0.79) 
0.002 
(1.55) 
0.000*** 
(2.56) 
-0.001** 
(2.44) 
0.000 
(1.20) 
-0.004 
(-1.53) 
-0.000 
(-0.01) 
-0.460*** 
(-7.75) 
1.300*** 
(3.48) 
p-Hausman test 
R2-adjusted 
N 
0.000 
0.32 
86,659 
0.000 
0.24 
8,704 
0.000 
0.38 
3,634 
0.000 
0.25 
20,918 
0.000 
0.35 
7,845 
0.000 
0.24 
31,583 
0.000 
0.36 
14,628 
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 All US ROW - Strong inv.p ROW - Weak inv.p 
 
  
 Healthy Distressed Healthy Distressed Healthy Distressed 
Panel B. Dependant variable is LTBLev: Long-term Debt/(Long-term Debt + Book Value of Equity) 
Inv.p 
 
CR 
 
Classical 
 
TD 
 
STDR 
 
MB 
 
Size 
 
ROA 
 
Tg 
 
WW Index 
 
Div-dummy 
 
Z-score 
 
Bank Dep. 
 
Bank Credit 
 
Ins. Prem. 
 
Bond Cap. 
 
Inter. Debt 
 
Stock Traded 
 
Inflation 
 
Domestic Savings 
 
Ind. Med 
 
Constant 
 
0.055*** 
(12.30) 
0.002** 
(3.01) 
0.007*** 
(4.10) 
0.039*** 
(8.66) 
-0.268*** 
(-8.14) 
-0.027*** 
(-8.82) 
0.045*** 
(5.84) 
-0.423*** 
(-8.47) 
0.088*** 
(21.36) 
-1.349*** 
(-72.26) 
0.174*** 
(9.23) 
0.023*** 
(8.04) 
-0.000*** 
(-5.99) 
0.000** 
(2.24) 
-0.000 
(-1.09) 
0.000*** 
(5.76) 
0.000*** 
(3.64) 
0.000*** 
(4.67) 
-0.002*** 
(-2.77) 
0.030) 
(0.76) 
0.327*** 
(5.06) 
0.036*** 
(3.68) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.026 
(0.39) 
-0.378*** 
(-10.18) 
-0.004*** 
(-4.06) 
0.078*** 
(3.85) 
-0.308** 
(-2.39) 
0.082*** 
(6.23) 
-1.833*** 
(-34.11) 
0.239*** 
(4.56) 
 
 
-0.005 
(-1.47) 
0.004** 
(2.63) 
-0.003** 
(-1.96) 
0.001** 
(2.22) 
0.000 
(0.26) 
-0.000** 
(-2.61) 
-0.007*** 
(-2.96) 
0.025 
(0.77) 
0.291*** 
(11.49) 
-0.216 
(1.38) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.095* 
(1.80) 
-0.098 
(-1.75) 
-0.007*** 
(-4.83) 
0.046*** 
(12.29) 
-0.373*** 
(-2.22) 
0.035* 
(1.75) 
-1.463*** 
(-16.51) 
0.221*** 
(9.35) 
 
 
-0.010*** 
(-3.71) 
0.002 
(0.65) 
-0.000 
(-0.04) 
0.002 
(1.51) 
-0.003* 
(-2.02) 
-0.000 
(-0.99) 
-0.006* 
(-1.71) 
0.132 
(1.04) 
0.180*** 
(4.19) 
-0.524 
(1.96) 
 
 
0.007** 
(2.38) 
0.006 
(0.35) 
0.007** 
(2.32) 
-0.132*** 
(-7.37) 
-0.031*** 
(-5.40) 
0.028*** 
(16.64) 
-0.310*** 
(-9.29) 
0.045*** 
(6.18) 
-0.895*** 
(-24.10) 
0.150*** 
(4.15) 
 
 
0.000 
(0.63) 
0.000** 
(2.16) 
0.000 
(0.40) 
0.000** 
(2.26) 
0.000** 
(2.20) 
0.000*** 
(4.48) 
-0.002 
(-1.32) 
0.032 
(1.54) 
0.396*** 
(7.80) 
0.084* 
(1.91) 
 
 
0.028** 
(1.97) 
0.027 
(0.66) 
-0.085 
(-1.02) 
-0.206*** 
(-7.38) 
-0.021** 
(-2.10) 
0.030*** 
(12.09) 
-0.306** 
(-2.56) 
0.083*** 
(7.21) 
-1.246*** 
(-22.59) 
0.198*** 
(33.83) 
 
 
-0.001 
(-0.06) 
0.000 
(0.76) 
0.002 
(1.59) 
-0.000 
(-0.96) 
0.000* 
(1.89) 
0.000 
(0.16) 
0.003 
(0.94) 
0.045 
(1.12) 
0.283*** 
(3.61) 
-0.202** 
(-1.97) 
 
 
0.006*** 
(5.34) 
0.006* 
(2.54) 
0.084*** 
(13.00) 
-0.255*** 
(-15.70) 
-0.031*** 
(-5.36) 
-.052*** 
(5.67) 
-0.470*** 
(-7.63) 
0.150*** 
(19.69) 
-1.299*** 
(-39.21) 
0.162*** 
(5.92) 
 
 
-0.002*** 
(-8.08) 
0.001*** 
(2.60) 
0.000 
(0.96) 
0.000*** 
(6.68) 
0.000*** 
(6.89) 
0.000*** 
(7.21) 
-0.010*** 
(-9.21) 
0.027 
(1.44) 
0.297*** 
(3.85) 
0.243*** 
(14.64) 
 
 
0.002 
(0.84) 
0.005 
(1.41) 
0.003 
(0.28) 
-0.109*** 
(-4.73) 
-0.032*** 
(-5.00) 
0.044*** 
(3.36) 
-0.419 
(-1.52) 
0.031 
(0.91) 
-1.602*** 
(-25.05) 
0.170 
(1.31) 
 
 
0.000 
(0.02) 
0.000 
(1.64) 
0.001 
(1.05) 
-0.000** 
(-1.86) 
0.000*** 
(2.72) 
0.000 
(1.08) 
-0.008*** 
(-4.53) 
0.044 
(1.38) 
0.154*** 
(5.75) 
-0.241*** 
(-9.96) 
p-Hausman test 
R2-adjusted 
N 
0.000 
0.30 
89,402 
0.000 
0.20 
8,251 
0.000 
0.33 
3,739 
0.000 
0.28 
21,710 
0.000 
0.42 
8,409 
0.000 
0.26 
32,319 
0.000 
0.30 
14,974 
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Panel C.  Interaction Effects 
Dependent variable STDR LTBLev 
Inv.p*Classical 
 
Inv.p*TD 
 
CR* Classical 
 
CR*TD  
 
Inv.p 
 
CR 
 
Classical 
 
TD 
 
Controls 
-0.118*** 
(-7.61) 
-0.141*** 
(-2.94) 
-0.005 
(-1.54) 
0.021 
(1.52) 
-0.012 
(-1.17) 
-0.003* 
(-1.72) 
-0.023** 
(-2.35) 
0.003 
(0.11) 
Yes 
0.079*** 
(8.99) 
0.031 
(1.14) 
0.061*** 
(10.13) 
0.011 
(0.99) 
0.006 
(1.04) 
0.002* 
(1.78) 
0.032*** 
(5.50) 
0.084*** 
(5.23) 
Yes 
p-Hausman test          
R2-adjusted 
N 
0.000 
0.30 
86,659 
0.000 
 0.38 
 89,402 
 
The table presents the fixed effects regression results based on two-stage simultaneous 
equations of short-term debt over total debt, STDR, (Panel A) and long-term debt/(long-term 
debt + equity at book value), LTBLev, (Panel B). The results of the two-stage procedure to 
generate the estimated book value of leverage (LTBLev) in Panel A and short-term debt 
maturity (STDR) in Panel B are not reported for space considerations. Following Dang 
(2011), in Panel A, the instruments for the book value of leverage include non-debt tax 
shields, tangibility, and profitability. In Panel B, the instruments for short-term debt maturity 
include asset maturity and term structure of interest rates. All regressions control for time 
effects. Panel C reports the interaction of governance and taxation on short-term debt 
maturity (STDR) and leverage (LTBLev). The overall sample included 134,794 firm-year 
observations from 24 OECD countries from 1990 to 2011. All is for the sample as a whole. 
ROW is for Rest of the World (excluding the US). We follow Alzahrani and Lasfer (2012) 
and classify ROW countries into strong (weak) investor protections if its anti-self-dealing 
index score, as reported by Djankov et al. (2008), is above (below) the mean anti-self-dealing 
index score of the sample. We use Z-score to measure financial distress and consider firms 
with Z values below 1.80 to be financially distressed. The remaining variables are defined in 
Appendix 1. We report the p-value of Hausman test to test the null hypothesis that the 
coefficients estimated by the efficient random effects estimator are the same as the ones 
estimated by the consistent fixed effects estimator. The t-statistics are in parentheses.
*
, 
**
, and 
***
 indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 4: Probit Regressions  
 All US ROW - Strong investor protection ROW - Weak investor protection 
 All ME Healthy ME Distressed ME Healthy ME Distressed ME Healthy ME Distressed ME 
Panel A: Dummy = 1 for increase Short-term debt maturity 
Inv.p 
 
CR 
 
Classical 
 
TD 
 
LTBLev 
 
MB 
 
Size 
 
AB 
 
ROA 
 
AM 
 
TS 
 
Z-score 
 
Bank Dep. 
 
Bank Cred. 
 
Ins. Prem. 
 
Bond Cap. 
 
Inter. Debt 
 
-0.102*** 
(-2.63) 
-0.014** 
(-2.31) 
-0.030** 
(-1.97) 
-0.064** 
(-2.16) 
-0.604*** 
(-3.95) 
0.013*** 
(5.28) 
-0.002 
(-0.66) 
0.356** 
(3.02) 
-0.122*** 
(-3.24) 
-0.179*** 
(-8.67) 
-0.004 
(-0.74) 
-0.025*** 
(-9.79) 
-0.000* 
(-1.76) 
-0.001*** 
(-6.39) 
0.005** 
(2.21) 
0.000 
(0.23) 
-0.000 
(-0.87) 
-0.04*** 
(-2.63) 
-0.01** 
(-2.31) 
-0.11** 
(-1.97) 
-0.02** 
(-2.16) 
-0.24*** 
(-3.95) 
0.01*** 
(5.28) 
-0.00 
(-0.66) 
0.14*** 
(3.02) 
-0.05*** 
(-3.24) 
-0.07*** 
(-8.67) 
-0.001 
(-0.74) 
-0.01*** 
(-9.79) 
-0.00* 
(-1.76) 
-0.00*** 
(-6.39) 
0.001** 
(2.21) 
0.000 
(0.23) 
-0.001 
(-0.87) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.609** 
(-2.33) 
-0.781*** 
(-8.97) 
0.002** 
(2.22) 
-0.005 
(-0.64) 
0.143 
(0.35) 
-0.070 
(-0.75) 
-0.268*** 
(-3.82) 
-0.028 
(-1.50) 
-0.000 
(-0.02) 
0.003 
(0.35) 
-0.007 
(-0.63) 
0.008 
(0.78) 
0.000 
(0.07) 
-0.012** 
(-2.01) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.24** 
(-2.33) 
-0.31*** 
(-8.97) 
0.006** 
(2.22) 
-0.002 
(-0.64) 
0.056 
(0.35) 
-0.027 
(-0.75) 
0.106*** 
(3.82) 
-0.011 
(-1.50) 
-0.002 
(-0.02) 
0.001 
(0.35) 
-0.002 
(-0.63) 
0.004 
(0.78) 
0.000 
(0.07) 
-0.00** 
(-2.01) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.257 
(-0.37) 
-0.640*** 
(-6.94) 
0.000** 
(2.01) 
-0.029** 
(-2.52) 
0.966 
(1.29) 
-0.253** 
(-2.15) 
-0.042 
(-0.52) 
-0.017 
(-0.51) 
-0.012 
(-0.49) 
-0.024* 
(-1.73) 
-0.001 
(-0.05) 
0.023 
(1.12) 
0.008 
(1.36) 
-0.006 
(-0.61) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.102 
(-0.37) 
-0.25*** 
(-6.94) 
0.000** 
(2.01) 
-0.01** 
(-2.52) 
0.385 
(1.29) 
-0.10** 
(-2.15) 
-0.016 
(-0.52) 
-0.007 
(-0.51) 
-0.004 
(-0.49) 
-0.009* 
(-1.73) 
-0.000 
(-0.05) 
0.009 
(1.12) 
0.003 
(1.36) 
-0.001 
(-0.61) 
 
 
-0.141*** 
(-3.23) 
-0.320** 
(-2.08) 
-0.327** 
(-2.24) 
-0.909*** 
(-4.79) 
0.017*** 
(3.21) 
-0.005 
(-0.91) 
0.316 
(1.18) 
-0.129 
(-1.53) 
-0.042 
(-1.06) 
-0.001 
(-0.12) 
-0.031** 
(-2.10) 
0.001** 
(2.06) 
-0.000 
(-0.87) 
0.003 
(0.62) 
0.000 
(0.34) 
-0.000 
 (-0.24) 
 
 
-0.06*** 
(-3.23) 
-0.12** 
(-2.08) 
-0.130** 
(-2.24) 
-0.36*** 
(-4.79) 
0.006*** 
(3.21) 
-0.001 
(-0.91) 
0.125 
(1.18) 
-0.051 
(-1.53) 
-0.016 
(-1.06) 
-0.001 
-(0.12) 
-0.011** 
(-2.10) 
0.001** 
(2.06) 
-0.000 
(-0.87) 
0.001 
(0.62) 
0.000 
(0.34) 
-0.000 
(-0.24) 
 
 
-0.101 
(-1.15) 
-0.371** 
(-1.95) 
-0.247 
(-1.11) 
-0.482*** 
(-6.42) 
0.008 
(1.13) 
-0.025*** 
(-3.24) 
-0.153 
(-0.38) 
-0.004 
(-0.04) 
-0.105* 
(-2.02) 
-0.014 
(-0.75) 
-0.003 
(-0.16) 
0.000 
(0.32) 
-0.000 
(-0.22) 
0.012 
(1.73) 
0.003* 
(1.71) 
-0.001 
(-1.43) 
 
 
-0.040 
(-1.15) 
-0.145** 
(-1.95) 
-0.098 
(-1.11) 
-0.19*** 
(-6.42) 
0.004 
(1.13) 
-0.01*** 
(-3.24) 
-0.061 
(-0.38) 
-0.002 
(-0.04) 
-0.042* 
(-2.02) 
-0.005 
(-0.75) 
-0.001 
(-0.16) 
0.000 
(0.32) 
-0.000 
(-0.22) 
0.013 
(1.73) 
0.001* 
(1.71) 
-0.000 
(-1.43) 
 
 
-0.002 
(-0.20) 
-0.022* 
(-1.93) 
-0.032* 
(-1.72) 
-0.827*** 
(-15.88) 
0.045*** 
(8.24) 
-0.006 
(-1.44) 
0.432** 
(2.27) 
-0.444*** 
(-4.00) 
-0.389*** 
(-8.69) 
0.010 
(0.91) 
-0.051*** 
(-3.35) 
0.001** 
(2.40) 
-0.000** 
(-2.60) 
0.014*** 
(3.69) 
0.000 
(0.08) 
-0.001** 
(-2.16) 
 
 
-0.000 
(-0.20) 
-0.008* 
(-1.93) 
-0.012* 
(-1.72) 
-0.33*** 
(-15.88) 
0.018*** 
(8.24) 
-0.002 
(-1.44) 
0.172** 
(2.27) 
-0.17*** 
(-4.00) 
-0.15*** 
(-8.69) 
0.003 
(0.91) 
-0.02*** 
(-3.35) 
0.002** 
(2.40) 
-0.00** 
(-2.60) 
0.00*** 
(3.69) 
0.000 
(0.08) 
-0.001** 
(-2.11) 
 
 
-0.026* 
(-1.76) 
0.031 
(0.90) 
-0.002 
(-0.03) 
-0.662*** 
(-11.76) 
0.020*** 
(2.59) 
-0.010* 
(-1.76) 
-0.553** 
(-2.12) 
-0.454*** 
(-3.41) 
-0.297*** 
(-5.51) 
-0.013 
(-0.85) 
-0.085*** 
(-3.86) 
-0.001 
(-0.39) 
-0.000 
(-1.57) 
0.001 
(0.11) 
0.000 
(0.09) 
-0.001* 
(-1.76) 
 
 
-0.010* 
(-1.76) 
0.012 
(0.90) 
-0.001 
(-0.03) 
-0.26*** 
-(11.76) 
0.007*** 
(2.59) 
-0.004* 
(-1.76) 
-0.22** 
(-2.12) 
-0.18*** 
(-3.41) 
-0.12*** 
(-5.51) 
-0.005 
-(0.85) 
-0.03*** 
-(3.86) 
0.000 
(-0.39) 
-0.001 
(-1.57) 
0.001 
(0.11) 
0.002 
(0.09) 
-0.001* 
(-1.76) 
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Stock Trad 
 
Inflation 
 
Domestic  
Savings 
Ind. Med 
 
Constant 
 
0.000 
(1.14) 
0.003 
(0.77) 
-0.068 
(-1.03) 
-0.220*** 
(-8.32) 
0.210*** 
(4.66) 
 
0.000 
(1.14) 
0.001 
(0.77) 
-0.027 
(-1.03) 
-0.09*** 
(-8.32) 
0.001 
(1.39) 
-0.009 
(-0.53) 
-0.307 
(-1.28) 
-0.221* 
(-2.09) 
1.031 
(0.88) 
 
0.001 
(1.39) 
-0.003 
(-0.53) 
-0.122 
(-1.28) 
-0.088* 
-(2.09) 
0.001 
(1.33) 
0.027 
(1.27) 
0.313 
(0.81) 
-0.239 
(-1.56) 
-0.434 
(-0.27) 
 
0.002 
(1.33) 
0.017 
(1.27) 
0.125 
(0.81) 
-0.095 
-(1.56) 
0.000 
(0.29) 
0.010 
(1.08) 
-0.118 
(-0.90) 
-0.218*** 
(-3.65) 
1.609*** 
(4.93) 
 
0.001 
(0.29) 
0.038 
(1.08) 
-0.118 
-(0.90) 
-0.09*** 
(-3.65) 
-0.001** 
(-2.32) 
0.013 
(0.85) 
-0.198 
(-0.95) 
-0.249** 
(-2.62) 
0.979 
(1.56) 
 
-0.00** 
(-2.32) 
0.005 
(0.85) 
-0.087 
(-0.95) 
-0.10** 
(-2.62) 
0.001*** 
(2.96) 
-0.022* 
(-2.42) 
-0.368*** 
(-2.94) 
-0.298*** 
(-6.02) 
0.431*** 
(4.61) 
 
0.000*** 
(2.96) 
-0.008* 
(-2.42) 
-0.15*** 
(-2.94) 
-0.12*** 
(-6.02) 
0.000 
(0.19) 
0.007 
(0.52) 
0.179 
(0.97) 
-0.303*** 
(-4.36) 
0.401*** 
(3.04) 
 
0.000 
(0.19) 
0.002 
(0.52) 
0.074 
(0.97) 
-0.12*** 
(-4.36) 
Pseudo R
2
 
p-LR λ2 
N 
0.06 
0.000 
91,898 
 0.07 
0.000 
9,579 
 0.04 
0.000 
4,186 
 0.08 
0.000 
22,221 
 0.07 
0.000 
8,812 
 0.07 
0.000 
31,916 
 0.06 
0.000 
15,184 
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Panel B: Impact of interaction of governance and taxation 
 All  ME All (ROW) ME 
1=increased short-term debt maturity, 0=decreased short-term debt maturity 
Inv.p*Classical 
 
Inv.p*TD 
 
Inv.p 
 
Classical 
 
TD 
 
-0.375*** 
(-2.86) 
-0.602* 
(-1.78) 
-0.702*** 
(2.61) 
0.148 
(1.22) 
0.217 
(1.26) 
-0.087*** 
(-2.73) 
-0.147* 
(-1.80) 
-0.168*** 
(2.59) 
0.034 
(1.13) 
0.062 
(1.49) 
-0.153** 
(-2.42) 
-1.026** 
(-2.50) 
-1.083*** 
(3.28) 
0.078 
(1.01) 
0.395** 
(1.99) 
-0.052** 
(-2.14) 
-0.190* 
(-1.90) 
-0.212*** 
(2.63) 
0.025 
(1.31) 
0.082* 
(1.69) 
1=increased short-term debt maturity, 0=Maintained short-term debt maturity 
Inv.p*Classical 
 
Inv.p*TD 
 
Inv.p 
 
Classical 
 
TD 
 
Controls 
-0.450** 
(-2.25) 
-0.087 
(-0.10) 
0.510 
(0.71) 
0.160 
(0.84) 
0.688 
(1.35) 
Yes 
-0.005* 
(-1.69) 
-0.006 
(-0.27) 
0.003 
(0.17) 
0.002 
(0.42) 
0.018 
(1.62) 
-1.537** 
(-2.49) 
-6.890*** 
(-6.20) 
0.09 
(1.00) 
0.582** 
(2.37) 
1.718 
(1.01) 
Yes 
-0.270*** 
(-2.60) 
-0.107*** 
(-5.71) 
0.093 
(1.32) 
0.011** 
(2.44) 
0.025 
(1.65) 
N 
Pseudo R2 
93,153 
0.08 
 79,122 
0.06 
 
 
The table presents the results from Probit regressions for the likelihood of increasing short-
term debt. The table also reports the marginal effects of coefficients. The overall sample 
included 134,794 firm-year observations from 24 OECD countries from 1990 to 2011. The 
dependent variable in Panel A is a dummy equals to 1 if the firm increases short-term debt 
maturity and zero otherwise. Panel B shows the likelihood of increasing short-term debt 
versus those firms who decrease and maintain their debt maturity, including the impact of 
interaction of governance and taxation.  All is for the sample as a whole. ROW is for Rest of 
the World (excluding the US). We follow Alzahrani and Lasfer (2012) and classify ROW 
countries into strong (weak) investor protections if its anti-self-dealing index score, as 
reported by Djankov et al. (2008), is above (below) the mean anti-self-dealing index score of 
the sample. We use Z-score to measure financial distress and consider firms with Z values 
below 1.80 to be financially distressed. The remaining variables are defined in Appendix 1. 
All regressions control time effects. The t-statistics are in parentheses. 
*
, 
**
, and 
***
 indicate 
significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  
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Table 5: Robustness Checks 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Panel A. Dependant variable is STDR: short-term debt/ total debt – Sample All 
Inv.p*Classical 
 
Inv.p*TD 
 
CR* Classical 
 
CR*TD 
 
CR 
 
Inv.p 
 
Classical 
 
TD 
 
Z-score[Hazard] 
 
Z-scoredev 
 
Controls 
-0.019*** 
(-4.10) 
-0.024*** 
(-3.36) 
-0.016 
(-1.19) 
-0.025*** 
(3.58) 
-0.004*** 
(-3.04) 
-0.007** 
(-2.51) 
-0.108*** 
(-6.15) 
-0.072*** 
(-3.05) 
-0.018*** 
(-5.89) 
 
 
Yes 
-0.029** 
(-2.06) 
-0.027*** 
(-2.84) 
-0.004 
(-0.13) 
-0.012* 
(1.74) 
-0.008 
(-0.49) 
-0.007 
(-0.74) 
-0.002 
(-0.03) 
-0.016 
(-0.79) 
-0.093*** 
(-4.42) 
 
 
Yes 
-0.145*** 
(-9.03) 
-0.044*** 
(-2.84) 
-0.002 
(-0.52) 
-0.010 
(-1.56) 
-0.001 
(-0.68) 
-0.021** 
(-1.95) 
-0.043*** 
(-4.18) 
-0.053* 
(-1.79) 
[0.052]*** 
(8.58) 
 
 
Yes 
-0.060*** 
(-3.22) 
-0.012*** 
(-3.24) 
-0.006* 
(-1.86) 
-0.009** 
(2.10) 
-0.007*** 
(-3.79) 
-0.010 
(-0.92) 
0.009 
(0.91) 
-0.056** 
(-1.92) 
-0.010*** 
(-8.12) 
 
 
Yes 
-0.460*** 
(-3.96) 
-0.321* 
(-1.94) 
0.028 
(0.78) 
-0.001** 
(-2.18) 
-0.186*** 
(-3.57) 
-0.093 
(-0.14) 
-0.094 
(-1.16) 
-0.140 
(-1.41) 
-0.028*** 
(-3.89) 
 
 
Yes 
-0.147*** 
(-5.34) 
-0.050*** 
(-2.61) 
0.002 
(0.42) 
-0.005 
(-1.25) 
-0.002*** 
(-3.52) 
-0.016 
(-0.86) 
-0.044 
(-0.02) 
-0.050 
(-1.11) 
-0.020*** 
(-6.88) 
 
 
Yes 
-0.128* 
(-1.79) 
-0.192** 
(-2.37) 
-0.005 
(-0.04) 
-0.479*** 
(-3.18) 
-0.054*** 
(-3.00) 
-0.057 
(-0.53) 
-0.094 
(-1.52) 
-0.002 
(-0.05) 
-0.022*** 
(-4.17) 
0.021 
(38.11) 
Yes 
R2-adjusted 
AR(1)/AR(2) 
Sargan test 
p-value (Wald) 
N 
0.30 
 
 
 
95,127 
0.49 
 
 
 
397 
0.30 
 
 
 
95,127 
0.32 
 
 
 
106,599 
 
0.048/0.11 
0.103 
 
90,505 
0.30 
 
 
 
95,127 
 
 
 
0.000 
86,659 
Panel B. Dependant variable is LTBLev: Long-term Debt/(Long-term Debt + Book Value of Equity) 
Inv.p*Classical 
 
Inv.p*TD 
 
CR* Classical 
 
CR*TD 
 
CR 
 
Inv.p 
 
Classical 
 
TD 
 
Z-score[Hazard] 
 
Z-score[dev 
 
Controls 
0.019*** 
(3.66) 
0.002 
(0.31) 
0.013*** 
(3.59) 
0.025*** 
(3.20) 
0.005 
(1.00) 
0.006* 
(1.76) 
0.091*** 
(4.72) 
0.143*** 
(6.29) 
0.020*** 
(3.89) 
 
 
Yes 
0.003*** 
(6.25) 
0.032** 
(2.26) 
0.003*** 
(2.76) 
0.012** 
(1.98) 
0.001** 
(2.23) 
0.017*** 
(4.35) 
0.011*** 
(3.13) 
0.030*** 
(3.33) 
 
 
 
 
Yes 
0.282*** 
(18.07) 
0.203*** 
(4.16) 
0.006* 
(1.84) 
0.054*** 
(2.94) 
0.004 
(0.25) 
0.122*** 
(11.24) 
0.120*** 
(11.71) 
0.289*** 
(10.14) 
[-0.04]*** 
(-6.52) 
 
 
Yes 
0.038*** 
(3.74) 
0.143*** 
(4.98) 
0.006*** 
(3.18) 
0.001 
(0.54) 
0.001 
(1.22) 
0.065*** 
(11.13) 
0.006 
(1.00) 
0.042*** 
(2.65) 
0.038** 
(2.25) 
 
 
Yes 
0.150*** 
(12.50) 
0.009 
(0.62) 
0.250*** 
(9.23) 
0.045** 
(1.95) 
0.047 
(1.85) 
0.212*** 
(12.98) 
0.004 
(0.52) 
0.019*** 
(2.85) 
0.029*** 
(6.58) 
 
 
Yes 
0.095*** 
(5.45) 
-0.043 
(-0.83) 
-0.004 
(-1.04) 
0.032*** 
(3.00) 
0.004 
(1.06) 
0.013 
(1.06) 
0.026** 
(2.30) 
0.140*** 
(4.79) 
0.021*** 
(4.88) 
 
 
Yes 
0.335*** 
(6.79) 
0.022 
(0.45) 
0.027*** 
(3.31) 
0.053*** 
(5.80) 
0.003 
(0.40) 
0.023*** 
(3.81) 
0.320*** 
(6.07) 
0.115*** 
(3.85) 
0.040*** 
(12.65) 
0.047 
(37.44) 
 
R2-adjusted 
AR(1)/AR(2) 
Sargan test 
p-value (Wald) 
N 
0.38 
 
 
 
103,149 
0.55 
 
 
 
423 
0.24 
 
 
 
103,151 
0.45 
 
 
 
103,151 
 
0.098/1.25 
0.201 
 
86,391 
0.38 
 
 
 
103,149 
 
 
 
0.000 
89,3379 
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Panel C. Dependant variable is STDR: short-term debt/ total debt – Healthy Firms 
Inv.p*Classical 
 
Inv.p*TD 
 
CR* Classical 
 
CR*TD 
 
CR 
 
Inv.p 
 
Classical 
 
TD 
 
Controls 
-0.024*** 
(-3.45) 
-0.031** 
(-8.10) 
-0.008*** 
(-3.58) 
-0.060*** 
(-4.58) 
-0.001** 
(-2.12) 
-0.015 
(-1.40) 
-0.040** 
(-2.57) 
-0.038 
(-1.28) 
Yes 
-0.013*** 
(-5.25) 
-0.009** 
(-2.12) 
-0.006* 
(-1.93) 
-0.025** 
(-2.35) 
-0.010** 
(-1.99) 
-0.010*** 
(-3.01) 
-0.025*** 
(-4.25) 
-0.020* 
(-1.79) 
Yes 
-0.169*** 
(-10.13) 
-0.014** 
(-2.26) 
-0.004 
(-1.18) 
-0.062*** 
(-5.42) 
0.007 
(0.37) 
-0.068*** 
(-5.83) 
-0.040*** 
(-3.78) 
-0.074*** 
(-4.49) 
Yes 
-0.152*** 
(-8.07) 
-0.003** 
(-2.06) 
-0.012*** 
(-2.78) 
-0.053*** 
(-4.30) 
-0.005** 
(-2.35) 
-0.035*** 
(-2.62) 
-0.031** 
(-2.57) 
-0.062* 
(-1.80) 
Yes 
-0.177*** 
(-3.20) 
-0.012** 
(-2.42) 
-0.076* 
(-1.86) 
-0.086** 
(-2.29) 
-0.008*** 
(-2.73) 
-0.079*** 
(-2.96) 
-0.051 
(-0.21) 
-0.072 
(-0.65) 
Yes 
-0.0125*** 
(-2.58) 
-0.008** 
(-1.99) 
-0.052** 
(-2.22) 
-0.62** 
(-2.45) 
-0.010*** 
(-4.58) 
-0.045** 
(-2.00) 
-0.035* 
(-1.75) 
-0.054 
(-1.25) 
Yes 
-0.079*** 
(-2.88) 
-0.074*** 
(-3.02) 
-0.008 
(-0.45) 
-0.041*** 
(-2.28) 
-0.022 
(-1.23) 
-0.028 
(-0.28) 
-0.042*** 
(-2.58) 
-1.892*** 
(-6.51) 
Yes 
R2-adjusted 
AR(1) 
AR(2) 
Sargan test 
p-value (Wald) 
N 
0.31 
 
 
 
 
67,544 
0.39 
 
 
 
 
397 
0.35 
 
 
 
 
76,472 
 
 
 
 
 
67,544 
 
0.052 
0.237 
0.123 
 
62,942 
0.28 
 
 
 
 
65,865 
 
 
 
 
0.000 
60,575 
Panel D. Dependant variable is LTBLev – Healthy Firms 
Inv.p*Classical 
 
Inv.p*TD 
 
CR* Classical 
 
CR*TD 
 
CR 
 
Inv.p 
 
Classical 
 
TD 
 
Controls 
0.012*** 
(4.96) 
0.020*** 
(3.97) 
0.001 
(0.60) 
0.049*** 
(6.41) 
0.003** 
(2.11) 
0.030*** 
(4.23) 
0.037*** 
(4.02) 
0.096*** 
(5.85) 
Yes 
0.002*** 
(3.01) 
0.004*** 
(2.98) 
0.002 
(1.02) 
0.007** 
(2.00) 
0.008** 
(1.98) 
0.010* 
(1.75) 
0.002** 
(1.99) 
0.019*** 
(2.65) 
Yes 
0.050*** 
(4.76) 
0.132*** 
(3.76) 
0.005 
(0.36) 
0.079*** 
(9.73) 
0.004*** 
(2.89) 
0.040*** 
(5.09) 
0.027*** 
(4.06) 
0.160*** 
(8.35) 
Yes 
0.010** 
(2.58) 
0.059*** 
(3.58) 
0.008* 
(1.70) 
0.068** 
(8.58) 
0.005** 
(2.24) 
0.038*** 
(6.58) 
0.020*** 
(3.12) 
0.088** 
(2.45) 
Yes 
0.018*** 
(4.15) 
0.055*** 
(5.45) 
0.015** 
(2.45) 
0.078*** 
(5.55) 
0.0019** 
(1.99) 
0.051*** 
(8.45) 
0.019*** 
(4.78) 
0.102** 
(2.00) 
Yes 
0.036*** 
(3.58) 
0.045** 
(2.47) 
0.010** 
(1.98) 
0.058** 
(1.99) 
0.009*** 
(3.41) 
0.028** 
(2.14) 
0.019*** 
(2.99) 
0.090** 
(2.01) 
Yes 
0.238*** 
(4.32) 
0.083** 
(1.85) 
0.016* 
(1.69) 
0.067*** 
(6.65) 
0.024 
(2.55) 
-0.002 
(-0.04) 
0.138*** 
(3.04) 
0.123** 
(2.34) 
Yes 
R2-adjusted 
AR(1)/AR(2) 
Sargan test 
p-value (Wald) 
N 
0.26 
 
 
 
71,140 
0.59 
 
 
 
423 
0.27 
 
 
 
79,179 
0.20 
 
 
 
71,140 
 
0.120/0.214 
0.193 
 
59,649 
0.25 
 
 
 
71,140 
 
 
 
0.000 
62,280 
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Panel E. Dependant variable is STDR: short-term debt/ total debt – Distressed firms 
Inv.p*Classical 
 
Inv.p*TD 
 
CR* Classical 
 
CR*TD 
 
CR 
 
Inv.p 
 
Classical 
 
TD 
 
Controls 
 
-0.025*** 
(-3.35) 
-0.016 
(-1.23) 
-0.010 
(-0.58) 
-0.083*** 
(-4.25) 
-0.003 
(-1.39) 
-0.019*** 
(-4.31) 
-0.042*** 
(-5.02) 
-0.139** 
(-2.19) 
Yes 
 
-0.044*** 
(-4.25) 
-0.161** 
(-2.16) 
-0.014** 
(-2.21) 
0.017 
(1.05) 
0.002 
(0.58) 
-0.028** 
(-2.35) 
-0.032 
(-1.22) 
0.042 
(0.54) 
Yes 
 
-0.114*** 
(-2.95) 
-0.656* 
(-1.87) 
-0.020 
(-1.11) 
-0.013 
(-0.50) 
-0.019*** 
(-3.84) 
-0.015*** 
(-3.98) 
-0.040 
(-0.15) 
-0.349*** 
(-4.24) 
Yes 
 
-0.150*** 
(-5.50) 
-0.485 
(-1.36) 
-0.023 
(-0.58) 
-0.022*** 
(-3.19) 
-0.004 
(-1.40) 
0.011 
(0.63) 
-0.043** 
(-2.35) 
-0.111** 
(-2.08) 
Yes 
 
-0.278** 
(-2.26) 
0.423 
(0.25) 
-0.027* 
(-1.85) 
0.017 
(0.22) 
-0.015** 
(-2.36) 
-0.041*** 
(-3.15) 
-0.025 
(-0.84) 
-0.110 
(-0.46) 
Yes 
 
-0.178*** 
(-4.52) 
-0.532 
(-1.25) 
-0.011 
(-1.20) 
-0.075** 
(-2.54) 
-0.001** 
(-2.42) 
-0.035** 
(-1.98) 
0.061 
(-1.12) 
-0.440 
(-0.64) 
Yes 
 
-0.486*** 
(-3.28) 
-0.379*** 
(-2.60) 
0.022 
(1.17) 
-0.076*** 
(-2.80) 
-0.078*** 
(-3.18) 
-0.173 
(-1.23) 
-0.265*** 
(-3.01) 
0.014 
(0.15) 
Yes 
 
R2-adjusted 
AR(1)/AR(2) 
Sargan test 
p-value (Wald) 
N 
0.34 
 
 
 
30,489 
0.45 
 
 
 
390 
0.19 
 
 
 
21,561 
0.38 
 
 
 
30,489 
 
0.023/0.118 
0.130 
 
27,563 
0.35 
 
 
 
29,262 
 
 
 
0.000 
26,107 
Panel F. Dependant variable is LTBLev: Long-term Debt/(Long-term Debt + Book Value of Equity)expect estimation (2)where we 
use Long-term Debt/(Long-term Debt + Market Value of Equity – Distressed firms 
Inv.p*Classical 
 
Inv.p*TD 
 
CR* Classical 
 
CR*TD 
 
CR 
 
Inv.p 
 
Classical 
 
TD 
 
Controls 
 
0.002 
(0.51) 
0.010 
(1.25) 
0.002 
(0.45) 
0.030** 
(2.08) 
0.002 
(0.89) 
0.021*** 
(4.35) 
0.022 
(1.57) 
0.071** 
(2.15) 
Yes 
 
0.001 
(0.53) 
0.004 
(0.91) 
0.003 
(0.75) 
0.019* 
(1.71) 
0.012* 
(1.68) 
0.018** 
(2.54) 
0.009 
(1.33) 
0.039 
(1.17) 
Yes 
 
0.006 
(0.30) 
0.104 
(1.50) 
0.008 
(1.44) 
0.008 
(0.54) 
0.005* 
(1.84) 
0.012** 
(2.49) 
0.016 
(1.00) 
0.070** 
(1.95) 
Yes 
 
0.001 
(1.25) 
0.058 
(1.25) 
0.001 
(1.35) 
0.010 
(1.25) 
0.008** 
(2.21) 
0.010*** 
(3.25) 
0.008 
(0.58) 
0.068* 
(1.78) 
Yes 
 
0.008 
(0.990 
0.040* 
(1.75) 
0.005 
(1.04) 
0.008* 
(1.74) 
0.017** 
(1.98) 
0.024*** 
(4.52) 
0.019 
(1.28) 
0.052** 
(2.05) 
Yes 
 
0.005 
(1.00) 
0.035 
(0.25) 
0.000 
(1.25) 
0.009 
(0.98) 
0.015** 
(2.11) 
0.008* 
(1.94) 
0.002 
(0.78) 
0.051 
(1.58) 
Yes 
 
0.542 
(0.25) 
0.035 
(0.32) 
0.064*** 
(4.19) 
0.071*** 
(3.36) 
0.032 
(1.51) 
-0.082 
(-0.67) 
0.324 
(1.21) 
0.054*** 
(2.87) 
Yes 
 
R2-adjusted 
AR(1)/AR(2) 
Sargan test 
p-value (Wald) 
N 
0.30 
 
 
 
32,300 
0.49 
 
 
 
416 
0.28 
 
 
 
24,261 
0.30 
 
 
 
32,300 
 
0.078/0.142 
0.111 
 
26,742 
0.35 
 
 
 
32,300 
 
 
 
0.000 
27,122 
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This table reports robustness checks: Panels A and B report the results for the sample as a 
whole. Panels C and D (E and F) report the results for healthy (distressed) firms. We use a 
two-stage procedure. The results in the first stage used to generate the estimated values of 
long-term book value of leverage (LTBLev) when the dependent variable is short-term debt 
maturity (STDR) and the estimated values of short-term debt maturity when the dependent 
variable is leverage. We report the results of the second stage using different strategies. In 
Equation (1) we use an alternative measure for investor protection, namely the revised 
measure of anti-directors rights from Spamann (2010) and classify countries into strong 
(weak) investor protections if its anti-directors rights are above (below) the mean anti-
directors rights of the sample. In Equation (2) we run country-level regressions using 448 
country-year (mean) observations from 24 countries over the period from 1990 to 2011. In 
Equations (1), (2), and (4) to (6) we use Z-score below 1.80 to define financially distressed 
firms, but in Equation (3) we use the Mehran and Prestiani’s (2010) and Bharath and 
Dittmar’s (2010) hazard rate. Companies are classified as healthy (distressed) if the hazard 
rate is below (above) the sample mean. In Equation (4), we include country-level institutional 
ownership over total market capitalisations, Ins. Ownership. In Equation (5), we use an 
alternative statistical approach (GMM-system), with, in Panels A, C, and E the first lagged 
short term debt maturity is included, L.STDR, and we use the second lagged debt short-term 
debt maturity as an instrument for short-term debt maturity. In Panels B, D, and F, we include 
the first lagged long-term book leverage, L.LTBLev. We use the second lagged long-term 
book leverage as an instrument for the first lagged long-term leverage. In Equation (5), 
following Dam (2011), we use lagged control variables as instruments to yield better fit. We 
report p-values for AR (1) and AR (2) to test the first-order and second-order serial 
correlation under the null hypothesis of no first-order and second-order serial correlation, 
respectively. We report p-values of Sargan test to test for over-identifying restrictions under 
the null hypothesis of valid instruments. In Equation (6), the standard errors are clustered at 
the firm level to control for heteroscedasticity and serial correlation of errors (Peterson, 
2009). In Equation (7), we estimate the hierarchical linear model (HLM) specification where, 
for firm level variables, we consider firm-level deviations and country-level means. For 
country-level variables, we consider grand-mean centred country-level deviations. The 
remaining variables are defined in Appendix 1. All regressions include time and firm effects. 
The t-statistics are in parentheses.*, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% 
levels, respectively. 
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Appendix 1: Definitions of Variables 
Variables  Description Source 
Inv.p The score of anti-self-dealing index. The higher 
the score, the higher the level of investor 
protection 
Djankov et al. (2008) 
CR Creditor rights index Djankov et al. (2007) 
Classical  A dummy variable equal to one if the firm located 
in a country that adopts classical tax system 
Alzahrani and Lasfer (2012), OECD 
tax database 
TD Tax discrimination based on Miller (1977), 
computed as =1-[(1-stautory corporate tax)
*
(1-
highest effective personal tax rate on equity)/(1-
highest statutory personal tax rate on interest)] 
OECD tax database 
(www.oecd.org/ctp/taxdatabase), 
World’s Highest Marginal Tax Rate 
on Global Finance website 
LTBLev Long-term debt/ Long-term debt + Book value of 
equity 
DataStream 
Div-dummy A dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the 
firm pays dividends and 0 otherwise. 
DataStream 
WW index We follow Whited and Wu (2006) and compute 
WW index as: -0.091Cash Flow-
0.062Div+,0.021LTDTD-0.044Size_0.0102ISG-
0.035SG, where WW-Cash Flow is operating 
income plus depreciation divided by beginning-
of-period total assets .WW-Div is an indicator that 
takes the value of one if the firm pays cash 
dividend. WW-LTDTD is the ratio of long-term 
debt over total assets. WW-Size is the natural 
logarithm of total assets. WW-ISG is the firm’s 3-
digit industrysales growth. WW-SG is firm sales 
growth 
DataStream 
Z-score 1.2(working capital/total assets)+1.4(retained 
earnings/total assets)+3.3(earnings before interest 
and taxes/total assets)+0.6(market value of equity/ 
book value of total liabilities)+0.999(sales/total 
assets) 
Eisdorfer (2008) and DataStream 
MB Market to book ratio DataStream 
Size Log of market capitalisation DataStream 
AB Abnormal earnings = (EPSt+1 - EPSt)/ SPt DataStream 
ROA Return on assets = EBIT/Total Assets DataStream 
AM Asset Maturity = PPE/ Depreciation DataStream 
Tg Tangibility=  Fixed Assets/ Total Assets DataStream 
NDTS Non-debt tax shields= Depreciation/ Total Assets DataStream 
Ind. Med Yearly industry median of debt maturity DataStream 
TS Term structure = BY10y – BY3m where BY is 
treasury bill or interbank rate if data not available 
DataStream 
Bank Dep. Bank deposits to GDP World Bank, FSD 
Bank Credit Bank credit to bank deposits  World Bank, FSD 
Ins. Prem. Life and non-life insurance premium volume to 
GDP 
World Bank, FSD 
Bond Cap. Public and private bond market capitalisation to 
GDP 
World Bank, FSD 
Inter. Debt International debt issues to GDP World Bank, FSD 
Loans Loans from non-resident banks to GDP World Bank, FSD 
Stock Traded Total value of stock traded to GDP Economic and Social Data Service, 
International Financial Statistics 
Inflation Annual rate of change on consumer price index Economic and Social Data Service, 
International Financial Statistics 
Domestic Savings Gross domestic saving to GDP Economic and Social Data Service, 
International Financial Statistics 
This table shows the definitions and data sources of both firm- and country-level data. FSD is for Financial 
Structure Database. All variables are measured in US dollars. 
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Appendix 2: Descriptive Statistics Ranked by Governance Index and Tax System 
Country N STDR Inv.p CR TD LTB
Lev 
MB Size AB ROA AM TS Bank  
Dep. 
Bank  
Credit 
Ins.  
Prem. 
Bond 
 Cap. 
Inter. 
 Debt 
Stock 
Traded 
Inflation Domestic 
Savings 
Ind. 
Med 
Panel A: strong investor  protection countries  
a) Classical                      
Ireland 356 0.29 0.79 1 0.14 0.31 2.71 12.81 0.00 0.04 0.29 1.25 90.04 177.21 7.07 98.60 114.77 24.31 2.83 0.22 0.72 
USA 22,037 0.28 0.65 1 0.29 0.22 3.03 11.58 0.00 -0.04 0.26 -0.23 68.74 77.59 6.55 153.97 25.60 201.35 2.55 0.24 0.73 
b) Partial Imputation  
Canada 4,570 0.33 0.64 1 0.23 0.25 2.34 12.28 0.00 0.02 0.44 0.89 117.01 95.93 5.39 86.93 27.27 73.14 2.17 0.25 0.75 
Ireland 185 0.36 0.79 1 0.18 0.27 2.19 12.13 0.01 0.08 0.34 0.45 54.04 111.95 7.80 41.77 16.91 30.35 2.26 0.26 0.66 
UK 9,956 0.45 0.95 4 0.14 0.20 2.61 11.86 0.00 0.03 0.29 -0.42 0.00 0.00 12.32 50.36 51.94 134.63 2.41 0.23 0.72 
c) Full Imputation  
Australia 29,100 0.31 0.76 3 0.00 0.27 2.64 12.55 0.00 0.02 0.36 0.28 72.88 130.56 6.40 65.15 35.75 77.74 2.83 0.24 0.80 
Canada 1,606 0.42 0.64 1 0.23 0.22 1.88 12.55 0.00 0.01 0.46 1.78 0.00 0.00 4.30 91.88 39.41 88.87 1.70 0.13 0.80 
New Zealand 856 0.35 0.95 4 0.01 0.26 2.19 11.63 0.00 0.08 0.44 0.39 73.33 142.32 2.91 33.13 9.27 16.76 2.61 0.22 0.70 
Panel B: weak investor protection countries  
a) Classical  
Austria 1,298 0.47 0.21 3 -0.05 0.26 1.95 11.83 0.00 0.06 0.34 1.11 78.50 116.96 4.57 71.39 30.13 17.31 2.10 0.24 0.54 
Belgium 1,272 0.43 0.54 2 -0.18 0.28 2.21 12.15 0.01 0.05 0.30 1.47 80.04 84.04 5.51 123.34 52.79 25.24 2.15 0.23 0.58 
Denmark 1,506 0.42 0.46 3 -003 0.24 2.12 11.62 0.00 0.05 0.34 0.76 55.49 162.74 7.43 181.84 25.08 42.25 2.13 0.22 0.59 
Germany 1,808 0.42 0.38 3 0.02 0.24 2.02 11.86 0.00 0.03 0.24 1.02 112.98 90.40 5.44 77.20 25.98 54.20 1.53 0.22 0.64 
Japan 31,066 0.58 0.50 2 0.04 0.21 1.33 11.80 0.00 0.04 0.32 1.00 200.51 54.12 6.96 196.83 7.10 86.66 -0.21 0.21 0.42 
Netherlands 1,024 0.35 0.20 3 0.08 0.27 3.10 13.58 0.00 0.08 0.27 1.03 90.26 213.95 6.30 102.46 80.41 108.11 2.18 0.23 0.66 
Poland 2,269 0.56 0.29 1 -0.08 0.14 2.11 10.95 0.00 0.06 0.33 0.37 41.59 51.39 3.24 36.18 10.51 16.44 3.05 0.22 0.42 
Portugal 465 0.44 0.44 1 0.13 0.38 2.01 12.20 0.00 0.05 0.35 1.09 95.56 130.27 5.72 70.30 42.98 27.36 2.78 0.23 0.56 
Spain 714 0.45 0.37 2 0.04 0.31 2.46 12.99 0.00 0.06 0.35 1.26 122.10 132.04 4.23 83.21 69.17 97.75 2.95 0.21 0.55 
Sweden 2,317 0.37 0.33 1 -0.14 0.23 2.77 11.39 0.00 -0.01 0.20 1.15 44.04 140.93 6.90 82.93 42.92 122.80 1.66 0.24 0.69 
Switzerland 2,526 0.37 0.27 1 0.25 0.25 2.33 12.64 0.00 0.06 0.33 0.92 124.04 126.93 7.51 61.01 27.28 182.55 1.19 0.23 0.66 
b) Partial Imputation  
Denmark 40 0.41 0.46      3 0.00 0.26 2.06 11.05 0.00 0.05 0.37 0.68 48.25 227.59 6.15 155.20 9.87 33.65 2.46 0.33 0.65 
Finland 715 0.39 0.46 1 -0.24 0.26 2.43 12.43 0.00 0.06 0.25 0.84 55.38 152.22 3.59 35.17 48.76 117.58 1.97 0.18 0.63 
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France 3,608 0.44 0.38 0 0.06 0.22 2.26 11.86 0.00 0.04 0.17 1.47 73.60 141.22 8.91 115.70 62.74 84.92 1.64 0.21 0.61 
Germany 2,914 0.46 0.28 3 0.10 0.24 2.24 11.63 0.01 0.03 0.25 0.90 95.85 114.24 5.38 80.97 39.70 70.10 1.65 0.21 0.58 
Italy 1,469 0.49 0.42 2 -0.11 0.29 2.04 12.56 0.00 0.04 0.25 1.62 67.08 151.01 6.77 127.67 53.78 50.68 2.06 0.21 0.54 
Luxembourg 183 0.35 0.28 1 0.07 0.27 2.07 13.09 0.01 0.10 0.35 2.37 336.10 44.06 5.84 74.06 84.90 15.05 2.41 0.20 0.69 
Norway 63 0.20 0.42 2 -0.22 0.41 2.16 11.69 0.00 0.00 0.42 -1.18 46.70 144.53 4.62 34.02 22.18 30.62 3.02 0.17 0.82 
Portugal 139 0.43 0.44 1 0.07 0.42 1.98 12.10 0.01 0.03 0.35 1.63 83.37 160.99 6.73 59.93 56.69 18.31 2.83 0.24 0.58 
Spain 862 0.49 0.37 2 0.10 0.25 2.36 12.82 0.01 0.08 0.36 1.22 77.57 131.03 4.69 60.12 38.44 117.98 3.11 0.25 0.52 
Turkey 2,100 0.67 0.43 2 0.05 0.15 1.97 11.53 0.01 0.08 0.36 0.21 38.57 65.45 1.03 29.73 7.50 43.73 4.48 0.23 0.28 
c) Full Imputation  
Finland 437 0.34 0.46 1 -0.53 0.25 2.17 11.77 0.01 0.06 0.31 1.44 46.50 126.82 4.03 45.67 35.86 131.22 1.67 0.27 0.68 
France 4,286 0.46 0.38 0 0.12 0.26 2.53 11.86 0.00 0.06 0.20 1.25 51.66 126.47 7.62 83.00 22.06 49.55 1.74 0.26 0.56 
Italy 1,177 0.53 0.42 2 0.17 0.27 1.98 12.45 0.00 0.05 0.26 1.03 49.83 133.72 4.67 127.04 17.43 35.93 2.95 0.23 0.47 
Mexico 1,152 0.36 0.17 0 -0.1 0.26 1.49 12.91 0.01 0.08 0.46 1.67 22.94 69.87 1.57 29.71 10.75 15.05 4.21 0.20 0.67 
Norway 718 0.24 0.42 2 -0.14 0.36 1.96 11.92 0.01 0.04 0.40 0.62 49.42 136.45 4.91 39.59 9.23 35.15 1.88 0.24 0.80 
Panel C: overall sample  
All strong 66,128 0.35
*** 0.74*** 2.34*** 0.13*** 0.24 2.72** 12.12 0.00 0.01* 0.33 0.10*** 62.26*** 89.61 7.16* 93.44*** 34.39*** 124.54*** 2.60*** 0.24 0.75*** 
All weak 68,666 0.51 0.42 1.72 0.03 0.23 1.79 11.91 0.00 0.04 0.30 1.04 131.95 89.29 6.33 134.97 21.70 77.16 1.07 0.22 0.50 
All classical 39,332 0.44
a,b 0.51a,b 1.64a,b,c 0.77 a,c 0.23 0.11 
b,c 
11.78 a,c 0.00 0.02 0.29 c 0.60 a,c 131.09 a,b,c 76.75 a,c 6.58b 156.67 a,b 19.80 a,b 121.27 a,b,c 1.19 a,b,c 0.22 0.56 a,b,c 
All partial 68,658 0.50 0.64 2.38 0.88 0.22 0.10 11.97 0.00 0.04 0.30 0.49 54.23 71.85 8.12 70.76 43.82 95.32 2.34 0.23 0.60 
All full 26,804 0.49 0.68 2.45 1.03 0.25 0.01 12.45 0.00 0.03 0.35 0.52 64.74 123.62 6.12 67.30 32.08 70.53 2.68 0.24 0.76 
All sample 134,794 0.43 0.59 2.02 0.92 0.24 0.08 12.01 0.00 0.02 0.31 0.55 96.45 89.45 6.75 113.26 28.16 101.30 1.85 0.23 0.63 
This table reports differences across subsamples based on the investor protection level and tax system. The overall sample included 134,794 firm-year observations from 24 
OECD countries from 1990 to 2011. We follow Alzahrani and Lasfer (2012) and classify a country as strong (weak) investor protections if its anti-self-dealing index score, as 
reported by Djankov et al. (2008), is above (below) the mean anti-self-dealing index score of the sample. The remaining variables are defined in Appendix 1.  
*
, 
**
, and 
***
 indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively between strong and weak protection. 
a, b, c 
significantly different at 1% level between Classical and 
Partial tax system, Classical and Full tax system, and between Full and Partial tax system, using two-tailed t-tests.  
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Appendix 3. Correlation Matrix 
 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 2
2 
1 STDR 1                      
2 Inv.p -0.14 1                     
3 CR -0.03 0.55 1                    
4 Classical  0.15 -0.67 -0.36 1                   
5 TD -0.03 0.13 -0.23 0.61 1                  
6 LTBLev -0.55 0.01 0.02 0.07 0.05 1                 
7 MB -0.04 0.23 0.00 -0.09 0.07 0.01 1                
8 Size -0.32 0.05 0.06 -0.12 -0.06 0.05 0.15 1               
9 AB -0.02 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.03 1              
10 ROA -0.14 -0.06 0.04 -0.05 -0.05 0.00 -0.15 0.38 0.13 1             
11 AM -0.20 -0.01 0.09 -0.08 -0.02 0.28 -0.14 0.10 -0.01 0.07 1            
12 Z-score 0.03 0.08 0.00 -0.00 0.05 -0.45 0.22 0.20 0.05 0.34 -0.17 1           
13 TS 0.06 -0.32 -0.17 0.04 -0.15 0.05 -0.14 0.03 0.03 0.09 0.03 -0.05 1          
14 Bank Dep. 0.19 -0.74 -0.12 0.54 -0.12 0.05 -0.23 -0.03 0.00 0.02 0.02 -0.07 0.25 1         
15 Bank Credit -0.13 0.14 -0.07 -0.22 -0.13 0.05 0.08 0.09 0.00 0.01 0.00 -0.00 0.07 -0.10 1        
16 Ins. Prem. 0.02 0.26 0.23 -0.06 0.02 -0.03 0.06 -0.01 0.00 -0.04 -0.08 -0.00 -0.08 -0.10 -0.21 1       
17 Bond Cap. 0.17 -0.57 -0.31 0.71 -0.03 -0.01 -0.15 -0.09 -0.01 -0.06 -0.08 -0.03 0.06 0.70 -0.24 0.01 1      
18 Inter. Debt -0.11 0.39 0.14 -0.32 -0.12 -0.02 0.10 0.04 -0.01 -0.08 -0.08 -0.03 -0.14 -0.33 0.21 0.14 -0.25 1     
19 Stock Traded -0.03 0.14 -0.17 0.29 0.20 -0.07 0.17 -0.05 -0.02 -0.18 -0.13 0.04 -0.43 -0.09 -0.15 0.34 0.27 0.18 1    
20 Inflation -0.17 0.56 0.08 -0.44 0.05 -0.02 0.21 0.03 -0.03 -0.04 0.02 0.05 -0.35 -0.67 0.23 -0.22 -0.56 0.26 0.08 1   
21 Domestic 
Savings 
-0.04 0.14 0.1 -0.08 0.05 0.01 0.04 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 0.00 0.00 0.05 -0.12 0.07 0.10 -0.16 -0.03 0.02 0.08 1  
22 Ind. Med -0.45 0.51 0.07 -0.32 0.07 0.12 0.14 0.20 0.01 0.01 0.17 0.01 -0.19 -0.41 0.24 -0.01 -0.32 0.26 0.15 0.37 0.08 1 
The table presents the Pearson correlation coefficients across our variables. The sample includes 134,794 firm/year observations from 24 OECD countries. The variables are 
defined in Appendix 1. All correlation coefficients are significant at 1% level except those in bold. The data is winsorized at the top and bottom 1%.  
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Appendix 4: Regressions by Country 
 
Dependant variable is STDR: short-term debt/ total debt   
 LTBLev MB Size AB ROA AM Ind. Med Constant N R2 
Australia -0.739 (-89.64) 0.016 (19.97) -0.027 (-31.64) -0.181 (-15.87) -0.035 (-5.41) -0.004 (-2.09) -0.148 (-11.69) 0.940 (69.71) 24,177 0.43 
Austria -0.530 (-15.25) 0.025 (5.64) -0.029 (-7.75) -0.162** (-1.98) 0.195 (5.54) -0.038 (-0.21) -0.664 (-21.74) 1.219 (29.23) 1,065 0.54 
Belgium -0.430 (-12.83) -0.002 (-0.61) -0.025 (-6.73) -0.227 (-3.38) 0.087 (2.75) -0.113 (-0.67) -0.686 (-20.18) 1.245 (29.29) 1,054 0.55 
Canada -0.825 (-39.70) 0.007 (2.76) -0.041 (-16.06) 0.036 (1.21) 0.001 (0.05) -0.210 (-1.84) -0.269 (-9.84) 1.229 (37.28) 4,210 0.43 
Denmark -0.470 (-13.73) 0.012 (3.31) -0.022 (-5.86) 0.044 (0.80) 0.014 (0.44) -0.209 (-2.22) -0.665 (-20.30) 1.157 (28.14) 1,357 0.44 
Finland -0.611 (-15.92) 0.013 (3.61) -0.005 (-1.29) -0.240 (-4.30) 0.057 (1.58) -0.083 (-0.53) -0.737 (-17.97) 1.034 (21.61) 1,040 0.43 
France -0.715 (-44.40) 0.006 (3.77) -0.010 (-6.57) -0.195 (-6.24) -0.020 (-1.09) 0.050 (0.58) -0.470 (-20.08) 1.020 (48.56) 6,394 0.35 
Germany -0.687 (-31.89) 0.012 (5.05) -0.014 (-6.64) -0.072** (-2.27) -0.046** (-2.02) -0.100 (-2.90) -0.462 (-16.90) 1.041 (37.92) 4,190 0.33 
Ireland -0.401 (-7.91) 0.004 (0.97) -0.004 (-0.81) -0.135* (-1.69) -0.020 (-0.52) 0.109 (0.38) -0.730 (-18.29) 1.020 (16.20) 423 0.70 
Italy -0.580 (-24.95) 0.017 (5.95) -0.022 (-7.07) -0.341 (-5.97) -0.074 (-3.03) 0.084 (0.60) -0.445 (-16.81) 1.176 (31.92) 2,139 0.47 
Japan -0.568 (-75.42) 0.013 (11.41) -0.027 (-32.12) -0.206 (-10.70) -0.040 (-4.51) 0.110 (3.18) -0.373 (-25.62) 1.181 (112.23) 29,027 0.28 
Luxembourg -0.731 (-6.39) 0.028* (1.87) 0.002 (0.16) -0.575* (-1.84) 0.024 (0.34) 0.465 (0.89) -0.689 (-7.53) 0.975 (6.10) 134 0.55 
Mexico -0.593 (-16.10) 0.016 (2.71) -0.026 (-5.71) -0.465 (-4.05) -0.119 (-3.64) 0.077 (0.47) -0.539 (-15.36) 1.272 (22.85) 859 0.59 
Netherlands -0.380 (-10.59) 0.011 (3.63) -0.014 (-3.45) -0.020 (-0.30) 0.045 (1.10) -0.231 (-1.18) -0.756 (-20.31) 1.102 (21.84) 883 0.51 
New Zealand -0.807 (-15.74) 0.021 (4.04) -0.016 (-2.63) 0.038 (0.50) -0.080** (-2.18) -0.050 (-0.24) -0.528 (-15.21) 1.078 (17.14) 745 0.61 
Norway -0.406 (-9.07) -0.012** (-2.46) -0.019 (-4.32) -0.160 (-2.59) 0.074** (2.01) 0.142 (0.85) -0.731 (-17.24) 1.182 (19.00) 585 0.54 
Poland -1.011 (-23.66) 0.009** (2.50) -0.005 (-1.12) -0.331 (-4.80) -0.068** (-2.07) 0.038 (0.22) -0.513 (-14.14) 1.004 (21.34) 1,585 0.40 
Portugal -0.463 (-13.28) 0.012 (3.17) -0.010** (-2.19) -0.235** (-2.36) 0.032 (0.86) 0.019 (0.10) -0.702 (-19.62) 1.116 (25.39) 535 0.71 
Spain -0.561 (-20.15) 0.000 (0.04) -0.010 (-2.88) -0.227 (-3.14) -0.127 (-5.13) -0.101 (-0.67) -0.577 (-20.37) 1.133 (29.01) 1,291 0.61 
Sweden -0.744 (-20.88) 0.008** (2.49) -0.006* (-1.71) -0.081* (-1.91) 0.022 (0.62) -0.250 (-1.34) -0.446 (-11.89) 0.902 (19.39) 1,781 0.35 
Switzerland -0.745 (-25.35) 0.012 (3.79) -0.009** (-2.39) -0.141** (-2.38) -0.081** (-2.56) -0.189 (-1.09) -0.508 (-18.68) 1.013 (21.02) 2,035 0.42 
Turkey -1.028 (-34.16) 0.022 (7.55) -0.027 (-7.58) -0.298 (-4.64) -0.189 (-6.49) -0.078 (-0.59) -0.236 (-7.86) 1.247 (30.86) 1,650 0.50 
United Kingdom -1.001 (-64.23) 0.020 (15.14) -0.025 (-16.69) -0.057 (-2.72) -0.019 (-1.46) -0.225 (-2.68) -0.271 (-15.67) 1.073 (59.32) 8,451 0.46 
United States -0.862 (-86.21) 0.015 (16.88) -0.049 (-42.07) -0.071 (-6.28) -0.040 (-3.99) 0.183 (2.60) -0.172 (-10.23) 1.210 (69.85) 17,349 0.43 
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Dependant variable is LTBLev: Long-term Debt/(Long-term Debt + Book Value of Equity) 
 STDR MB Size ROA Tg Ind. Med Constant N R2   
Australia -0.537 (-27.39) -0.010 (-15.99) 0.022 (34.50) -0.019 (-2.26) 0.175 (20.55) 0.807 (49.88) 0.160 (9.43) 22,509 0.27   
Austria -0.522 (-4.89) -0.021 (-5.56) 0.023 (6.91) -0.236 ((3.93) 0.219 (3.74) 0.688 (13.12) 0.216 (2.03) 1,092 0.26   
Belgium -0.433 (-4.13) 0.011 (3.67) 0.004 (1.41) -0.137 (-2.58) 0.259 (6.88) 0.884 (19.29) 0.518 (5.88) 1,060 0.40   
Canada -0.420 (-10.59) -0.018 (-11.79) 0.021 (13.08) -0.043 (-2.30) 0.231 (12.15) 0.866 (31.51) 0.123 (3.17) 4,360 0.32   
Denmark -0.569 (-7.03) -0.009 (-3.50) 0.000 (0.18) -0.073 (-1.93) 0.252 (6.59) 0.847 (19.95) 0.498 (7.05) 1,370 0.33   
Finland -1.291 (-15.25) -0.009 (-3.50) 0.015 (5.79) -0.184 (-4.75) 0.229 (7.23) 0.737 (15.94) 1.023 (14.90) 1,056 0.38   
France -1.055 (-22.01) -0.008 (-6.73) 0.012 (10.79) -0.245 (-11.51) 0.372 (23.66) 0.589 (21.44) 0.799 (21.43) 6,507 0.26   
Germany -1.486 (-25.72) -0.008 (-5.24) -0.005 (-3.50) -0.041 (-1.89) 0.282 (14.15) 0.412 (10.52) 0.992 (22.66) 4,232 0.22   
Ireland -0.601 (-5.47) 0.011 (-3.57) 0.017 (4.24) -0.167 (-2.73) 0.237 (5.42) 0.992 (19.51) 0.284 (3.08) 428 0.65   
Italy -0.593 (-7.97) 0.002 (0.85) 0.033 (12.15) -0.247 (-5.19) 0.178 (6.10) 0.892 (20.10) 0.057 (0.82) 2,150 0.28   
Japan -1.292 (-12.23) -0.030 (-34.86) 0.004 (5.53) -0.499 (-34.26) 0.317 (12.47) 0.402 (25.99) 1.012 (33.67) 28,842 0.24   
Luxembourg 0.109 (0.47) -0.027 (-3.24) 0.022 (2.47) -0.008 (-0.04) 0.196 (1.81) 0.891 (6.88) 0.040 (0.20) 144 0.33   
Mexico -0.352 (-3.02) -0.002 (-0.37) 0.020 (4.00) -0.281 (-2.42) 0.030 (0.51) 1.026 (15.60) -0.034 (-0.31) 542 0.36   
Netherlands -0.446 (-3.35) 0.013 (4.89) 0.015 (4.64) -0.126 (-2.31) 0.132 (3.18) 0.875 (16.80) 0.169 (1.61) 885 0.38   
New Zealand -0.421 (-4.93) -0.012 (-3.74) 0.015 (3.88) 0.070 (1.37) 0.252 (5.81) 0.960 (18.96) 0.192 (2.35) 755 0.42   
Norway -1.132 (-10.64) -0.013 -(2.96) 0.000 (0.00) -0.012 (-0.23) 0.151 (2.27) 0.568 (10.64) 0.794 (7.33) 558 0.53   
Poland -0.488 (-7.31) 0.018 (8.87) 0.010 (4.19) -0.109 (-2.95) 0.176 (5.89) 0.556 (11.56) 0.262 (4.50) 1,442 0.20   
Portugal -0.269 (-1.48) 0.016 (3.44) 0.019 (3.56) -0.030 (-0.24) 0.009 (0.16) 0.888 (12.05) -0.079 (-0.53) 502 0.35   
Spain -0.598 (-7.51) 0.001 (0.36) 0.029 (9.66) -0.555 (-8.75) 0.159 (3.91) 0.840 (18.57) 0.115 (1.44) 1,352 0.42   
Sweden -0.844 (-10.39) -0.007 (-3.75) 0.009 (4.31) 0.014 (0.58) 0.210 (8.11) 0.779 (18.62) 0.516 (8.57) 1,910 0.30   
Switzerland -0.839 (-11.25) 0.016 (-7.23) 0.008 (3.37) -0.079 (-1.94) 0.242 (6.91) 0.722 (16.87) 0.752 (11.35) 2,156 0.30   
Turkey -0.594 (-6.03) 0.011 (3.66) 0.007 (1.69) -0.353 (-5.33) 0.486 (7.46) 0.634 (10.74) 0.662 (6.38) 913 0.25   
United Kingdom -0.631 (-19.14) -0.010 (-11.61) 0.021 (21.50) -0.039 (-3.08) 0.167 (13.41) 0.612 (21.59) 0.217 (8.11) 8,988 0.33   
United States -1.026 (-35.19) -0.009 (-12.27) 0.003 (2.88) 0.049 (5.30) 0.281 (26.70) 0.541 (25.40) 0.751 (32.56) 14,495 0.38   
This table reports regression coefficient (t-statistics) by country. The dependent variable in Panel A is short-term debt maturity (STDR) computed as short-term debt over total 
debt. The dependent variable in Panel B is leverage (LTBLev) computed as long-term Debt/(Long-term Debt + Book Value of Equity). The remaining variables are defined in 
Appendix 1.  
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Appendix 5: Debt Maturity and Leverage by Year 
 ALL US ROW - Strong investor protection ROW - Weak investor protection 
 Stressed Healthy Stressed Healthy Stressed Healthy Stressed Healthy 
 STDR LTBLev STDR LTBLev STDR LTBLev STDR LTBLev STDR LTBLev STDR LTBLev STDR LTBLev STDR LTBLev 
1990 0.271 0.441 0.356 0.239 0.175 0.473 0.285 0.221 0.212 0.463 0.341 0.243 0.371 0.404 0.427 0.244 
 (0.185) (0.465) (0.271) (0.221) (0.087) (0.508) (0.190) (0.187) (0.127) (0.476) (0.231) (0.232) (0.339) (0.429) (0.401) (0.229) 
1991 0.296 0.433 0.356 0.227 0.223 0.509 0.294 0.201 0.242 0.440 0.346 0.232 0.392 0.405 0.426 0.233 
 (0.202) (0.461) (0.270) (0.200) (0.118) (0.560) (0.169) (0.155) (0.139) (0.478) (0.247) (0.206) (0.382) (0.425) (0.399) (0.206) 
1992 0.303 0.433 0.360 0.219 0.225 0.483 0.321 0.191 0.235 0.448 0.348 0.225 0.393 0.408 0.420 0.228 
 (0.219) (0.466) (0.268) (0.195) (0.122) (0.497) (0.217) (0.154) (0.138) (0.489) (0.235) (0.221) (0.364) (0.423) (0.391) (0.199) 
1993 0.307 0.437 0.346 0.224 0.312 0.415 0.338 0.196 0.222 0.466 0.328 0.228 0.398 0.409 0.397 0.236 
 (0.203) (0.474) (0.256) (0.200) (0.141) (0.446) (0.221) (0.139) (0.125) (0.494) (0.220) (0.209) (0.382) (0.412) (0.360) (0.225) 
1994 0.301 0.420 0.356 0.211 0.271 0.354 0.346 0.171 0.204 0.467 0.330 0.226 0.419 0.398 0.428 0.223 
 (0.209) (0.453) (0.276) (0.184) (0.129) (0.423) (0.234) (0.114) (0.125) (0.479) (0.236) (0.213) (0.384) (0.414) (0.404) (0.205) 
1995 0.297 0.423 0.352 0.217 0.306 0.400 0.322 0.174 0.196 0.450 0.323 0.242 0.399 0.405 0.463 0.210 
 (0.202) (0.461) (0.266) (0.191) (0.193) (0.464) (0.221) (0.110) (0.103) (0.479) (0.233) (0.229) (0.367) (0.429) (0.441) (0.175) 
1996 0.317 0.404 0.351 0.214 0.332 0.371 0.338 0.179 0.225 0.450 0.318 0.233 0.397 0.374 0.433 0.215 
 (0.217) (0.446) (0.260) (0.184) (0.193) (0.411) (0.220) (0.111) (0.118) (0.481) (0.214) (0.217) (0.345) (0.397) (0.385) (0.183) 
1997 0.337 0.383 0.354 0.219 0.380 0.312 0.342 0.180 0.241 0.425 0.313 0.247 0.407 0.383 0.444 0.208 
 (0.223) (0.430) (0.268) (0.186) (0.265) (0.250) (0.232) (0.117) (0.122) (0.474) (0.197) (0.228) (0.374) (0.413) (0.421) (0.178) 
1998 0.363 0.347 0.366 0.221 0.415 0.267 0.360 0.179 0.276 0.398 0.321 0.254 0.419 0.378 0.451 0.211 
 (0.255) (0.369) (0.274) (0.191) (0.322) (0.195) (0.251) (0.110) (0.139) (0.442) (0.213) (0.240) (0.361) (0.382) (0.412) (0.178) 
1999 0.363 0.347 0.373 0.220 0.390 0.285 0.370 0.178 0.286 0.388 0.336 0.252 0.438 0.360 0.442 0.213 
 (0.255) (0.364) (0.280) (0.187) (0.272) (0.228) (0.264) (0.099) (0.159) (0.441) (0.216) (0.232) (0.421) (0.368) (0.409) (0.182) 
2000 0.452 0.356 0.448 0.193 0.389 0.290 0.364 0.180 0.356 0.341 0.344 0.240 0.517 0.384 0.537 0.171 
 (0.437) (0.364) (0.402) (0.149) (0.262) (0.248) (0.257) (0.094) (0.223) (0.364) (0.243) (0.217) (0.524) (0.391) (0.529) (0.131) 
2001 0.463 0.343 0.451 0.193 0.414 0.294 0.369 0.188 0.369 0.328 0.341 0.232 0.519 0.363 0.539 0.174 
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 (0.448) (0.355) (0.411) (0.144) (0.304) (0.239) (0.225) (0.108) (0.237) (0.344) (0.229) (0.211) (0.522) (0.375) (0.540) (0.128) 
2002 0.466 0.331 0.454 0.191 0.426 0.267 0.368 0.197 0.380 0.321 0.330 0.226 0.517 0.355 0.550 0.169 
 (0.451) (0.334) (0.396) (0.146) (0.330) (0.189) (0.223) (0.133) (0.222) (0.329) (0.205) (0.199) (0.528) (0.357) (0.533) (0.121) 
2003 0.460 0.345 0.450 0.188 0.400 0.301 0.387 0.181 0.360 0.332 0.320 0.224 0.518 0.361 0.542 0.170 
 (0.425) (0.352) (0.394) (0.141) (0.256) (0.256) (0.251) (0.106) (0.193) (0.355) (0.195) (0.203) (0.507) (0.366) (0.523) (0.119) 
2004 0.438 0.348 0.445 0.188 0.416 0.289 0.375 0.179 0.343 0.333 0.320 0.217 0.492 0.373 0.531 0.175 
 (0.402) (0.362) (0.389) (0.142) (0.326) (0.216) (0.249) (0.103) (0.171) (0.367) (0.190) (0.195) (0.481) (0.378) (0.502) (0.125) 
2005 0.433 0.337 0.453 0.183 0.408 0.284 0.386 0.170 0.363 0.323 0.331 0.213 0.481 0.362 0.537 0.169 
 (0.376) (0.343) (0.407) (0.134) (0.300) (0.211) (0.258) (0.094) (0.203) (0.330) (0.194) (0.177) (0.455) (0.362) (0.514) (0.120) 
2006 0.438 0.330 0.455 0.179 0.412 0.293 0.382 0.170 0.379 0.315 0.340 0.208 0.491 0.355 0.537 0.165 
 (0.392) (0.334) (0.404) (0.129) (0.310) (0.247) (0.252) (0.098) (0.211) (0.320) (0.209) (0.173) (0.466) (0.358) (0.510) (0.116) 
2007 0.426 0.328 0.458 0.177 0.398 0.300 0.379 0.173 0.371 0.319 0.350 0.210 0.478 0.346 0.539 0.160 
 (0.375) (0.325) (0.409) (0.123) (0.298) (0.256) (0.252) (0.098) (0.193) (0.336) (0.219) (0.175) (0.469) (0.338) (0.518) (0.108) 
2008 0.438 0.312 0.472 0.176 0.426 0.283 0.380 0.178 0.373 0.303 0.346 0.213 0.493 0.330 0.561 0.156 
 (0.372) (0.300) (0.428) (0.120) (0.291) (0.218) (0.231) (0.103) (0.209) (0.289) (0.213) (0.175) (0.473) (0.318) (0.549) (0.100) 
2009 0.440 0.314 0.444 0.173 0.424 0.283 0.373 0.167 0.375 0.293 0.335 0.206 0.491 0.338 0.522 0.155 
 (0.384) (0.303) (0.383) (0.114) (0.306) (0.219) (0.219) (0.096) (0.184) (0.281) (0.182) (0.169) (0.477) (0.330) (0.493) (0.094) 
2010 0.437 0.317 0.433 0.171 0.383 0.287 0.372 0.165 0.401 0.293 0.340 0.198 0.480 0.343 0.503 0.156 
 (0.380) (0.307) (0.365) (0.116) (0.215) (0.252) (0.211) (0.100) (0.224) (0.266) (0.182) (0.157) (0.463) (0.335) (0.462) (0.099) 
2011 0.426 0.317 0.436 0.173 0.377 0.312 0.344 0.180 0.383 0.295 0.340 0.199 0.475 0.337 0.512 0.156 
 (0.361) (0.303) (0.373) (0.117) (0.199) (0.299) (0.154) (0.124) (0.187) (0.278) (0.178) (0.159) (0.455) (0.317) (0.477) (0.098) 
Total 0.425 0.339 0.431 0.189 0.398 0.296 0.364 0.178 0.350 0.334 0.335 0.221 0.487 0.356 0.523 0.169 
 (0.370) (0.347) (0.367) (0.142) (0.265) (0.252) (0.232) (0.109) (0.228) (0.361) (0.208) (0.196) (0.476) (0.357) (0.500) (0.120) 
This table reports the average (median) debt maturity (STDR) and leverage (LTBLev) by year. All is for the sample as a whole. ROW is for Rest of the World (excluding the 
US). We follow Alzahrani and Lasfer (2012) and classify ROW countries into strong (weak) investor protections if its anti-self-dealing index score, as reported by Djankov et 
al. (2008), is above (below) the mean anti-self-dealing index score of the sample. We use Z-score to measure financial distress and consider firms with Z values below 1.80 to 
be financially distressed.  
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Appendix 5. Comparative analysis of the tax systems and TD between our sample period and 2012-2016 
     
Country  TD 1990-2011 TD 2012-2016   
Panel A: strong investor  protection countries 
a) Classical                      
Ireland  0.14 0.175   
USA  0.29 0.181   
b) Partial Imputation 
 
Canada  0.23    
Ireland  0.18    
UK  0.14 0.034   
c) Full Imputation 
 
Australia  0.00 0.004   
Canada  0.23 0.035   
New Zealand  0.01 0.000   
Panel B: weak investor protection countries 
a) Classical  
Austria  -0.05 -0.097   
Belgium  -0.18 -0.087   
Denmark  -003 0.010   
Germany  0.02 0.021   
Japan  0.04 -0.023   
Netherlands  0.08 -0.172   
Poland  -0.08 0.035   
Portugal  0.13 -0.122   
Spain  0.04 -0.046   
Sweden  -0.14 -0.241   
Switzerland  0.25 -0.066   
b) Partial Imputation 
Denmark  0.00    
Finland  -0.24 -0.181   
France  0.06 0.188   
Germany  0.10    
Italy  -0.11 -0.102   
Luxembourg  0.07 0.005   
Norway  -0.22    
Portugal  0.07    
Spain  0.10    
Turkey  0.05 -0.027   
c) Full Imputation 
Finland  -0.53    
France  0.12    
Italy  0.17    
Mexico  -0.10 0.054   
Norway  -0.14    
Panel C: overall sample 
 
All strong  0.13 0.072   
All weak  0.03 -0.050   
All classical  0.77
  -0.033   
All partial  0.88 -0.014   
All full  1.03 0.023   
All sample  0.92 -0.018   
Note: Similar to 2006-2011, we exclude Norway as we could not classify Norway tax system in 2012-2016 because 
they apply other tax treatments. 
Source: OECD tax database. 
